Dore Metals and Mining Corporation v. United Silver Mines, Inc. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Dore Metals and Mining Corporation v. United
Silver Mines, Inc. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ray G. Martineau; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis and Petersen Attorneys for Appellee.
Lloyd J. Webb; Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen and Webb; Bunderson and Baron; Roger F. Baron;
Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Dore Metals v. United Silver, No. 900155 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2545
UTAH COURT OF AP 
BRIEF 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CKET NO 
DORE METALS AND MINING : 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 900155-CA 
Cross-Appellant, : 
vs. : Oral Argument 
Priority No. 16 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., : 
a corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE GORDON J. LOW, DISTRICT JUDGE 
RAY G. MARTINEAU, ESQ. 
40 East South Temple, Suite 3 60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, ESQ. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
LLOYD J. WEBB, ESQ. 
WEBB, BURTON, CARLSON, 
PEDERSEN & WEBB 
155 Second Avenue North 
P. O. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
ROGER F. BARON, ESQ. 
BUNDERSON AND BARON 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE GORDON J. LOW, DISTRICT JUDGE 
RAY G. MARTINEAU, ESQ. 
40 East South Temple, Suite 3 60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, ESQ. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
LLOYD J. WEBB, ESQ. 
WEBB, BURTON, CARLSON, 
PEDERSEN & WEBB 
155 Second Avenue North 
P. O. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
ROGER F. BARON, ESQ. 
BUNDERSON AND BARON 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Case No. 900155-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority No. 16 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The following corporations are affiliates of the plaintiff 
Dore Metals and Mining Corporation: Liberty Loan Corporation 
("LLC") , Oklahoma Morris Plan Company, and Morris Plan Company. 
Thomas H. Church, of Church, Church & Snow, Burley, Idaho, 
also represents plaintiff in this action. 
An entity affiliated with defendant, and which owns the 
real property which was the subject of this action, is Bannock 
Silver Mining Company. Thomas F. Miller is the president of 
defendant. 
All other parties are shown on the cover page. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES V 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 4 
A. Nature of the Case 4 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Belov. . 4 
C. Statement of Facts 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 14 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT HOLDING THAT UNITED SILVER DID NOT HAVE 
MARKETABLE TITLE 14 
A. Standard of Review 14 
B. United Was Required to Tender Marketable 
Title 14 
C. The Hoffman Claims Clouded Title 17 
D. The Commitment For Title Insurance Did Not 
Make The Title Marketable 20 
E. United Did Not Have Clear And Marketable 
Title To The Dumps At Any Time Material 
Herein 25 
ii 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT UNITED WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
SUCCESSFULLY RESISTING DORE'S CLAIM FOR RESCIS-
SION. . 
POINT TIT 
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARDED TO DORE ON ITS Sl'f-
CESSFUL DEFENSE OF UNITED'S CLAIM FOR A LINE 01 
CREDIT WAS NOT UNREASONABLY HIGH. . . . 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OF DORE'S ATTORNEY 
FEE CLAIM WAS NOT SUPPORTED " ""^ FVTDENCE. 
Fi.il NT V 
UNITED WAS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT 
PATH FOR PURCHASE OF TIMBER 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL 
STANDARD IN RULING ON DORE'S PRAYER FOR RESCIS-
SION 
POINT VIT 
UNITED .. ,. -n TrTlc' ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL 3 
i i i i i r i j i . " , i i'pir 3 
APPENDIX 
A Memorandum Decision <~r motions for partial 
summary judgment) 
B. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment .iinl 
Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
C. Order Determining Uncontroverted Facts and 
Conclusions of Law 
D. Memorandum - '-" ittert litigated at 
trial) 
E. Memorandum Decision tc,,\ attorney fees) 
iii 
F. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
G. Judgment 
H. Vipont Confirmation Project Agreement 
I. Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc. 116 Idaho 
240, 775 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1989). 
J. Portions of Affidavit of Ray G. Martineau re 
Costs and Attorneys Fees 
K. Summary of Attorney Fees 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited; 
50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency. 784 
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989) 2, 27 
Avotte v. Redmon. 110 Idaho 726, 718 P.2d 1164 (1986). . 27 
Bergstrom v. Moore. 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984) 36 
BLT Investment Co. v. Snow. 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978). . . 27 
Breur-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) 37-40 
Burrow v. Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) 35 
Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) 29 
Converse v. Zinke. 635 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1981) 22 
Corporation Nine v. Taylor. 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 
(1973) 15 
Darby v. Keeran. 211 Kan. 133, 505 P.2d 710 (1973). . . . 16 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988)3, 28-30 
Ferris v. Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) 4, 39 
Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 39 
Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983) 16 
Hastings v. Matlock, 171 Cal. App. 3d 826, 217 Cal. Rptr. 
856 (1985) 27 
Hedgecock v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. . 676 P.2d 1208 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1983) 16 
Hoffman v. United Silver Mines. Inc.. 116 Idaho 240, 775 
P.2d 132 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) 18, 24 
Kipahulu Investment Co. v. Seltzer Partnership. 4 Haw. 
App. 625, 675 P.2d 778 (1983), cert, denied. 67 Haw. 
635, 744 P.2d 781 (1984) 17, 21 
Makofsky v. Cunningham. 576 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1978). . 21 
V 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates. 617 
P.2d 406 (Utah 1980) 39 
McFadden v. Wilder. 6 Ariz. App. 60, 429 P.2d 694 
(1967) 16 
Michaelson v. Tieman. 36 Colo. App. 435, 541 P.2d 91 
(1975) 16, 17 
Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance 
Co.. 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 
(1970) 16 
Parsons Supplyf Inc. v. Smith. 22 Wash. App. 520, 591 P.2d 
821 (1979) 22 
Polvcflvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979). . 36 
Preston v. McDonnell. 203 Mont. 64, 659 P.2d 276 
(1983) 27 
Ouealv v. Anderson. 714 P. 2d 667 (Utah 1986) 28 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210 
(Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990) 3, 33 
Richfield v. Walker. 790 P.2d 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 3, 35 
Rogers v. Relvea. 184 Mont. 1, 601 P.2d 37 (1979). . . . 22 
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist. 
773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) 2, 14 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985) 28 
Speckert v. Bunker Hill Arizona Mining Co. . 6 Wash. 2d 39, 
106 P.2d 602 (1940) 34 
State ex rel R. R. v. C. R.. 797 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) 39 
White v. Coeur D'Alene Big Creek Mining Co. . 56 Idaho 282, 
55 P.2d 720 (1936) 19 
Windward Partners v. Lopes. 3 Haw. App. 30, 640 P.2d 872 
(1982) 22 
vi 
Statutes and Rules Cited; 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 19 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1990) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1990) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (Supp. 1990) 2 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 4(d) 1 
Other Authorities Cited: 
77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 123 (1975) 15 
vii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee. 
Case No. 900155-CA 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment appealed from was entered June 19, 1989. 
(R. 1574-76.) Defendant served a Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on June 28, 1989. (R. 
1577-81.) The trial court denied the motion by Memorandum 
Decision entered August 31, 1989. (R. 1598.) Defendant filed 
its Notice of Appeal on September 27, 1989. (R. 1600-01.) 
The Notice of Appeal was timely under Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on October 10, 1989. 
(R. 1602-03.) The cross appeal was timely under Utah R. App. 
P. 4(d). 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this 
case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1990). The Supreme 
Court poured this case over to the Court of Appeals as authori-
zed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1990) . This court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Was a party contractually required to extend a loan 
to be secured by real property and for which a title insurance 
commitment had been issued, where there was an adverse claim 
which might affect title to the property, the lender had actual 
notice of the claim, and the title insurance commitment would 
not insure against such claims, and where the primary purpose 
of the contract had been frustrated by the potential borrower's 
failure to tender marketable title? This issue was decided 
below on summary judgment, and is reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
B. In a contract action where the contract contains a 
provision for attorney fees to the prevailing party, is a party 
who successfully resists a claim for rescission of that 
contract entitled to an award of attorney fees? This is a 
question of contract interpretation to be reviewed for cor-
rectness. 50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment Agency, 
784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989). 
C. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in fixing 
the attorney fee awarded to the prevailing party, where there 
was adequate evidence to support the award, and where there 
was evidence that the prevailing party incurred fees far in 
excess of the award? The award is reviewed for abuse of 
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discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988) . 
D. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
the prevailing party a fee far less than that actually in-
curred, where there was no evidence that the fee incurred was 
not reasonable and the trial court's allocation of the fee to 
various aspects of the case was arbitrary and contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence? The question of whether the 
award was supported by the evidence is a question of law, see 
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 
(Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), 
although the amount of the award is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Id. ; Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988). 
E. In an action on a cost-only contract, did the trial 
court err as a matter of law in failing to order repayment of 
money paid for purchase of timber, where the undisputed evi-
dence showed that other timber had already been purchased and 
not used? Because the evidence on this issue was not in 
substantial dispute, it is reviewed by this Court for correct-
ness. Richfield v. Walker, 790 P. 2d 87, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
F. Did the trial court apply an erroneous legal stand-
ard in ruling on a party's prayer for rescission, in holding 
that rescission was precluded by that party having allowed the 
breaching party an opportunity to cure the breach, rather than 
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immediately seeking rescission upon learning of the grounds 
therefor? The question of whether the trial court applied the 
right legal standard is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1979). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Appellee is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpreta-
tion is determinative of the issues presented in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a civil action arising primarily out of a 
written contract. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff Dore Metals and Mining Corporation ("Dore") 
filed its complaint on August 17, 1983, seeking to recover 
possession of various items of equipment alleged to be wrong-
fully held by defendant United Silver Mines, Inc. ("United") 
and for other related relief. (R. 1-6.) At a show cause 
hearing held September 12, 1983, the parties stipulated that 
Dore could recover possession of the equipment upon posting of 
a bond for $90,000.00. (R. 19.) Dore subsequently posted the 
bond. (R. 31-33.) 
United thereafter filed its Answer and Counterclaim 
asserting it was entitled to recover charges for storage of 
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the equipment and further asserting it was entitled to damages 
for Dore's failure to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit. 
(R. 20-30.) 
On February 15, 1985, United filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment seeking a determination that Dore had become 
obligated to extend to United the $500,000.00 line of credit. 
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 18, 1985, as-
serting in essence that United had failed to tender marketable 
title to the subject mining properties and had otherwise 
breached its obligations under the contract between Dore and 
United, and seeking rescission of the contract and damages for 
breach of the contract, in addition to recovery of the equip-
ment. (R. 338-54.) Following substantial discovery addressed 
to the issues raised by United7s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Dore filed a response to the motion (R. 794-941), 
and filed its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 787-
88) . 
The motions for summary judgment were argued before the 
court, Judge Omer J Call, on March 12, 1986 (R. 1045), and on 
April 8, 1986, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision 
concluding that Dore was entitled to summary judgment ab-
solving it of liability to extend the $500,000.00 line of 
credit. The trial court denied all other aspects of the 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 1051-54, copy in Appendix 
A.) A formal Order was entered May 20, 1986 (R. 1063-65, copy 
in Appendix B), together with an Order Determining Un-
5 
controverted Facts and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1055-62, copy 
in Appendix C.) 
Judge Call retired, and the case was ultimately set for 
trial before Judge Gordon J. Low commencing June 8, 1988. (R. 
1112.) On May 5, 1988, United moved to vacate the trial date 
and to continue the matter pending determination of a case 
pending in Idaho, which case had been one of the bases for the 
prior grant of summary judgment in the instant case. (R. 1117-
18.) Dore responded and asserted that the resolution of the 
Idaho case was irrelevant because the prior grant of summary 
judgment was now the law of the case and not subject to 
modification. (R. 1152.) Prior to trial, the defendant 
submitted a trial brief which asserted, among other things, 
that Judge Call's prior grant of summary judgment was er-
roneous and should not be considered the law of the case. (R. 
1181-1203.) At the beginning of trial, Judge Low held that 
Judge Call's prior decision was the law of the case and would 
not be reconsidered. (Tr.1 4.) 
The case was tried to the court on June 8, 9 and 10, 1988. 
The trial court entered a Memorandum Decision on August 31, 
1988, finding some issues in favor of Dore and some in favor 
of United, and awarding a net judgment to Dore in the sum of 
$13,428.80 with the issue of attorney fees reserved for later 
Unless otherwise indicated, all transcript citations are 
to the transcript of the trial held commencing on June 8, 1988. 
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determination. (R. 1422-29, copy in Appendix D.) The parties 
submitted affidavits regarding attorney fees (R. 1432-1499; 
1506-1553) , and the attorney fee issues were heard by the court 
on February 22, 1989. (R. 1554.) The trial court entered a 
Memorandum Decision on attorney fees on April 3, 1989. (R. 
1557-61, copy in Appendix E.) 
Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 1563-
73, copy in Appendix F), and a Judgment (R. 1574-76, copy in 
Appendix G) were entered on June 18, 1989. United thereafter 
moved to amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment. (R. 1577-81.) The motion to amend was denied by 
Memorandum Decision entered August 31, 1989. (R. 1598.) 
United thereafter perfected its appeal (R. 1600-01), and Dore 
filed a cross appeal (R.1602-03). 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This case focuses on the Vipont Mines, a group of 53 
patented mine claims covering approximately 1,000 acres, 
located in the northwest corner of Box Elder County, ap-
proximately 1.5 miles from the Idaho border and 10 miles from 
the Nevada border. (Tr. 370-71.) The mines were discovered 
in about 1864 by John and William Vipont. (Tr. 374.) The mine 
passed through several hands, and in 1918 was leased to Robert 
Phelan. (Tr. 375.) Phelan undertook substantial development 
and mined in excess of 3,000,000 ounces of silver and 8,3 00 
ounces of gold, making it one of the largest silver mines in 
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the United States at the time. (Tr. 376.) Following a drop 
in the price of silver, the mine again passed through several 
hands, and was ultimately closed in 1942. (Id.) Thereafter, 
in 1963 and 1964, after an increase in the price of silver, 
Thomas F. Miller acquired a leasehold interest in the mines. 
(Id.) 
Mr. Miller formed defendant United Silver Mines, Inc. 
("United"), a Utah corporation, in 1973. (Tr. 370.) In 1977, 
United sought financing from an individual named Paul Hoffman 
and executed with him a certain Limited Partnership Agreement-
-Vipont Mines, Ltd. (R. 446, 585-600, 1059. A copy of the 
Hoffman Partnership Agreement is attached to United7s brief 
herein.) Title to the Vipont Mines at this time was held by 
Bannock Silver Mining Company. Hoffman acquired the outstand-
ing stock of Bannock as part of his obligations to Vipont 
Mines, Ltd. Differences subsequently arose between Hoffman 
and United, and Hoffman commenced litigation against United. 
(R. 798.) Hoffman asserted in the litigation against United 
that he had contributed substantial sums of money to the 
limited partnership, and that he had a 25% interest in the 
partnership and further had a valid lien upon the Vipont Mine 
property and a claim to 80% of the net proceeds realized from 
the processing of the dumps and tailings which are a part of 
the Vipont Mine property. (R. 1059.) 
In early 1981, while the litigation with Hoffman was 
pending, United sought an infusion of capital from Dore in 
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response to an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal. (Tr. 
372.) The negotiations ultimately culminated in the execution 
of a Vipont Confirmation Project Agreement ("confirmation 
agreement"). (R. 1057, Ex. 2, copy in Appendix H.) The 
confirmation agreement in essence provided that Dore would 
undertake a project to confirm whether certain specified 
amounts of silver existed in the mine, and granted to Dore an 
option to enter into a joint venture with United to develop 
the mines. The agreement contemplated that United would, at 
Dore's expense, rehabilitate the A-level adit2 which was the 
main entrance to the underground mine. 
Under the proposed joint venture, a copy of which was 
attached to the confirmation agreement, Dore would provide a 
$6,000,000.00 credit line, and would ultimately be a half owner 
of the mines. Prior to actual vesting of title, Dore's 
investment would be secured by a first trust deed on the mines. 
The confirmation agreement further provided that if Dore 
elected to not enter into the joint venture, it would nonethe-
less provide United with a $500,000.00 line of credit at 
certain specified terms, secured by the A-level and Phelan 
dumps on the mine property. 
2An "adit" is an opening which leads into an underground 
mine, as contrasted with a tunnel, which has opening on both 
ends (i.e., goes all the way through a mountain) . A "crosscut" 
is a horizontal internal opening from a shaft to an ore 
deposit. A "drift" is a tunnel with no openings to the outside 
air (e.g., from one internal shaft to another). Although these 
are the technical definitions, the words are sometimes used 
interchangeably. (R. 307-08.) 
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The confirmation agreement provided that October 15, 1981, 
was the deadline for exercise of the option. On October 14, 
1981, Steven Friedrich, the president of LLC, Dore's parent 
company, and LLC's general counsel, Thomas Slaughter, traveled 
to Twin Falls, Idaho in preparation for exercising the option 
and closing the agreement. (Tr. 61, 63.) In anticipation of 
closing, Dore had caused 1.6 million dollars to be transferred 
to a local bank. (Tr. 63-64.) United had previously disclosed 
the pendency of the Hoffman litigation, but Thomas Miller had 
stated that Hoffman's claims concerned only a request for an 
accounting and did not pose any problem to the proposed joint 
venture. (Tr. 119.) At the meeting on October 15, 1981, 
Dore's counsel telephoned the attorney for Hoffman in the 
Hoffman litigation and was informed that Hoffman intended to 
press a claim for ownership rights in the Vipont Mines. (Tr. 
130, 134.) Based on that information, Dore determined to not 
proceed with the joint venture at that time because of the lack 
of marketable title. (Tr. 137-38.) 
To give United an opportunity to resolve the title prob-
lems, the option to enter into the joint venture agreement was 
extended by mutual agreement of the parties from time to time, 
but it ultimately expired on February 3, 1983. (R. 1058.) 
Prior to that date, United delivered to Dore a commitment for 
title insurance issued by Hillam Abstracting and Insurance 
Company of Brigham City, Utah, and underwritten by First 
American Title Insurance Company. The commitment offered to 
iw 
issue a title insurance policy with a face amount of 
$6,000,000.00, subject to the restrictions and exclusions 
listed in the commitment, and insuring that Bannock Silver 
Mining Company held title to the mines, (Exhibit 8, R. 1058, 
Tr. 165.) Dore concluded that the title insurance did not 
resolve the title problems (Tr. 192-94), and never exercised 
the option to enter into the joint venture. 
After the final expiration of the option to enter into 
the joint venture, United made demand on Dore for the 
$500,000.00 line of credit described in the confirmation 
agreement. Dore declined to grant the line of credit assert-
ing that the same title problems made United unable to provide 
the required security for the line of credit. (Tr. 348.) Dore 
then sought to recover possession of certain of the equipment 
it had purchased for United's use in the confirmation project, 
including a load-haul-dump ("LHD") machine purchased by Dore 
at a cost of approximately $98,000.00. (Tr. 351.) United 
refused to relinquish possession of the equipment unless Dore 
paid approximately $80,000.00 in claimed storage charges. (Tr. 
350-51, Ex. 31.) Dore thereafter commenced this litigation. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The summary judgment dismissing United's claims relating 
to the $500,000.00 line of credit was compelled by the un-
disputed facts. An implicit requirement of the confirmation 
agreement was that United have the ability to convey market-
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able title to the mines. United clearly did not have that 
ability. Title to the mines was vested in Bannock Silver 
Mining Company. Although United claimed to own the stock of 
Bannock, in actual fact the stock had been purchased by Hoffman 
and contributed to Vipont Mines, Ltd. Hoffman had a lien on 
the stock and hence on the mine properties to secure his rights 
under the Vipont limited partnership. Even if it is ultimately 
determined in the Idaho litigation that Hoffman did not have 
such a right, he claimed such a right at the times relevant to 
this action. It is the fact the adverse claim is made, not its 
ultimate validity, which renders title unmarketable. 
The commitment for title insurance did not render the 
title marketable. Insurable title is not the equivalent of 
marketable title. Dore was not a lender whose interest could 
be protected by title insurance, but had an option to acquire 
a half ownership in the mines. In addition, the exclusions in 
the title policy would have applied to render the policy 
ineffective because Dore had actual knowledge of Hoffman's 
claims. 
United breached its agreement to perform the confirmation 
project on a cost-only basis and overcharged Dore for the work 
performed. The confirmation agreement provided that Dore would 
pay United $43,000.00 for purchase of timber to be used in the 
confirmation project. The undisputed testimony established 
that the timber was purchased but not used. Instead, United 
purchased additional timber and billed Dore for that additional 
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timber. Dore was entitled to recover for the additional timber 
purchased. The trial court's denial of Dore's claims was 
contrary to the undisputed evidence. 
United challenges the award of attorney fees to Dore. 
The evidence supports the fee awarded, but further shows that 
the fee was too low. Counsel for Dore asserted that ap-
proximately 75% of the over $170,000.00 in fees was incurred 
in defending United's claims related to the line of credit. 
The trial court apparently ignored this testimony and ar-
bitrarily awarded fees for only one-half of the time prior to 
the ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment and 
failed to award any fees for subsequent work defending the 
summary judgment. The reduction was arbitrary and not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HOLDING THAT UNITED SILVER DID NOT HAVE 
MARKETABLE TITLE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The district court held on summary judgment that Dore had 
no obligation to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to United. 
The summary judgment should be reviewed by this court for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. The facts 
and inferences therefrom are to be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and the summary judgment should 
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be affirmed only if no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Pavincr, Inc. v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
B. United Was Required to Tender Marketable Title. 
The district court dismissed United7s claim for damages 
for Dore's failure to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit 
because United failed to tender marketable title to the sub-
ject mining properties. Title is critical to two facets of 
the confirmation agreement, depending on whether or not Dore 
exercised the option to enter into the joint venture with 
United. If Dore exercised the option to enter into the joint 
venture, the proposed joint venture contemplated that Dore 
would extend a $6,000,000.00 line of credit to United, secured 
by a first trust deed on all of the mining properties. After 
the line of credit became fully advanced, Dore would become 
entitled to actual fee title to a one-half interest in the 
mining properties. 
The second area in which title was critical was if Dore 
elected to not enter the joint venture agreement. The confir-
mation agreement provided that Dore would then be obligated to 
extend to United a $500,000.00 line of credit, secured by the 
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A-level and Phelan dumps. United failed to tender marketable 
title either to the mining properties or to the dumps.3 
United represented in the proposed joint venture agree-
ment that it could cause Dore to be deeded a "one-half fee 
simple interest" in the mining properties, title to which was 
in Bannock Silver Mining Company. Even had United not ex-
pressly represented that it controlled title to the subject 
mining claims, a requirement that it hold title on the date 
Dore chose to exercise its option to enter the joint venture 
agreement would have been implied in law. See Corporation Nine 
v. Taylor. 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973). The term 
"title" must be construed to mean and refer to clear and 
marketable title, free of all liens and encumbrances. 77 Am. 
Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 123 (1975); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 
671 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah 1983). United's duty to tender mar-
ketable title was a condition precedent to any duty on the part 
of Dore to extend a line of credit. McFadden v. Wilder, 6 
Ariz. App. 60, 429 P.2d 694, 697 (1967).4 
3It is not entirely clear from the agreements whether the 
dumps are considered to be part of the mining properties. See 
Footnote 6 of Dore,s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Plain-
tiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at R. 829-30, and 
the cases cited thereat. 
4United cites to McFadden as support for the proposition 
that "an %acceptable owner's title insurance policy' is 
sufficient to satisfy any condition precedent which involves 
the furnishing of xtitle'." (United's Brief at p. 15.) It 
appears more likely from the opinion that the furnishing of 
title insurance was required by the contract at issue in that 
case. 429 P.2d 694. There is certainly nothing in the opinion 
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Marketable or merchantable title is that quality of title 
which a reasonably prudent man familiar with the facts would 
accept in the ordinary course of business. It must be free 
from liens and encumbrances, free from reasonable doubt as to 
its validity, and free from the hazard of present or potential 
litigation. Hedqecock v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. , 676 P.2d 
1208, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Darby v. Keeran, 211 Kan. 
133, 505 P.2d 710, 715 (1973). An adverse claim to the prop-
erty may render the title unmarketable, even if the adverse 
claim is not actively asserted. Paramount Properties Co. v. 
Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746, 
749, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970); Michaelson v. Tieman, 36 Colo. 
App. 435, 541 P.2d 91 (1975). 
Marketable title is not the same as insurable title. 
Title may still be considered unmarketable even though a title 
company is willing to write a title insurance policy insuring 
the validity of the title. Kipahulu Investment Co. v. Seltzer 
Partnership, 4 Haw. App. 625, 675 P.2d 778 (1983), cert, 
denied, 67 Haw. 635, 744 P.2d 781 (1984). 
The burden of proving that title is marketable is upon 
the party asserting the validity of the title, and that burden 
in this action was therefore upon United. Michaelson, supra, 
541 P.2d at 92. 
which would indicate that the Court of Appeals of Arizona made 
a reasoned determination that insurablity is equivalent to 
marketability. 
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C. The Hoffman Claims Clouded Title, 
Applying the above rules to the facts in the instant 
matter, it is clear that United did not possess, own, or 
control and did not tender marketable title to the subject 
mining claims to Dore at any relevant time. The cloud against 
the title was not just a mere possibility of a claim of ques-
tionable merit, but was a claim actually asserted in a pending 
action in which a business partner of United, Paul Hoffman, 
asserted, and continued to assert through trial in the instant 
case, a substantial interest in the subject mining claims and 
the dumps and tailings located thereon. 
Hoffman's claims arise from a Limited Partnership Agree-
ment—Vipont Mines, Ltd. and other documents executed between 
Hoffman and United. The partnership agreement provided that 
Hoffman was to make certain contributions to the partnership, 
and that he would "be entitled to hold and claim a lien upon 
the interest of the General Partner [United] and the Partner-
ship in the Vipont Silver Mine property and upon any minerals 
produced therefrom until the contributions have been fully 
repaid." (Limited Partnership Agreement (attached to United's 
brief) 5 3.2(g).) The parties devoted substantial effort 
before the trial court to analyze the partnership agreements 
to determine whether Hoffman's lien rights had matured. A 
thorough analysis of the effect of those documents appears in 
Dore's memoranda filed with the trial court. (R. 794-834; 
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1004-15.) A detailed analysis of those claims is not neces-
sary in this brief, however, because the Hoffman litigation 
was the subject of an opinion issued by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals subsequent to the trial in this matter. Hoffman v. 
United Silver Mines. Inc., 116 Idaho 240, 775 P.2d 132 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1989). A copy of the opinion appears in Appendix "I" 
of this brief. Although the Court of Appeals of Idaho held 
that the agreements were ambiguous in certain respects, 775 
P.2d at 138, the court held that the agreements were clear in 
providing that Hoffman's contributions "were characterized as 
xloans,' secured by a xlien' on the general partner's interest 
and on the partnership itself." 775 P. 2d at 136. See also 
775 P.2d at 139, 140. 
The ultimate resolution of the Hoffman litigation and the 
concomitant determination of the "correct" interpretation to 
be given to the agreements is not, however, relevant to the 
instant action. Title is not marketable if there is a threat 
of litigation, regardless of whether the claim ultimately 
proves groundless. 
United asserts in its brief that the effect of the Hoffman 
claims was nonetheless vitiated by the title insurance commit-
ment and by a preliminary injunction entered in the Hoffman 
litigation. Neither rendered title marketable. 
The preliminary injunction entered in the Hoffman litiga-
tion ordered Hoffman to release a lis pendens he had filed 
against the mining claims. A copy of the release is attached 
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to United's brief. United argues that if the court ordered 
Hoffman to not claim a lien# it follows that his claims did 
not cloud title. 
United's argument fails for several reasons. First, the 
preliminary injunction was just that, preliminary.5 The 
underlying claims still existed. Second, on November 26, 1982, 
which was subsequent to the preliminary injunction but prior 
to the final expiration of Dore's option to enter the joint 
venture agreement, Hoffman filed an Amended Complaint in the 
Hoffman action, in which he asserted that Phase I of the 
development contemplated by the partnership agreement had been 
completed (i.e., $750,000.00 had been spent in developing the 
mines), and that Hoffman was therefore the owner, and entitled 
to be the owner of record, of a 25% interest in the limited 
partnership and that he was entitled to certain specified 
percentages of the income produced from the subject mining 
Under Idaho law, the Order in Re Motions for Preliminary 
Injunctions of Plaintiff and Defendant, entered in the Hoffman 
action on June 22, 1982, only determined the following: (1) 
United's counterclaim in that action (which prayed for prelim-
inary and permanent injunctive relief) stated a cause of 
action; i.e. , it was not subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to stat a claim, see White v. Coeur D'-
Alene Big Creek Mining Co. , 56 Idaho 282, 55 P.2d 720, 722 
(193 6) (movant does not need to show that he would be entitled 
to the relief prayed for on final hearing, but only that the 
transaction is a proper subject of investigation by a court of 
equity) ; (2) the assertion by Hoffman of an interest in the 
subject mining claims pending the disposition of the Hoffman 
action on its merits might result in irreparable injury to 
United; and (3) Hoffman's assertion of an interest in the 
subject mining claims during the pendency of the action would 
tend to render any judgment upon the counterclaim ineffectual. 
See Idaho R. Civ. P. 65(e). 
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claims and the dumps and tailings. (R. 515-26.) It is there-
fore evident that Hoffman claimed an interest in Vipont Mines, 
Ltd. , and in the subject mining claims and the dumps and 
tailings and any income produced therefrom at all times from 
October 15, 1981, through and including February 3, 1983. 
Finally, as noted below at page 24 of this brief, prior 
to the instant trial the court in the Hoffman litigation 
entered a judgment holding that Hoffman was entitled to claim 
a lien. 
The Hoffman litigation and claims certainly at least 
raised a suspicion concerning United's ability to cause Bannock 
to convey clear title. Title was not marketable at the times 
critical to this action. 
D. The Commitment For Title Insurance Did Not Make The 
Title Marketable. 
At some point after the initial deadline for exer-
cise of the option to enter the joint venture agreement, but 
prior to the last extension, United tendered to Dore a commit-
ment for title insurance. (Exhibit 8, Tr. 165.) The exis-
tence of this commitment did not make title marketable for 
several reasons. First, "marketable title" and "insurable 
title" are not synonymous terms. Kipahulu Investment Co. v. 
Seltzer Partnership, 675 P.2d 778, 781 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); 
Makofsky v. Cunningham. 576 F.2d 1223, 1235 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Makofsky stated the rule as follows: 
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[A] title insurance policy is 
not equivalent to a merchantable 
title in Louisiana; it is an 
agreement by an insurer to 
satisfy claims against the prop-
erty. It is limited in coverage 
to the amount stated on its 
face. A buyer who erects im-
provements having a value in 
excess of the face amount of the 
policy will not be protected for 
the excess. In any event, 
having the right to make claims 
is not the eguivalent of as-
surance that no claims need be 
made. 
576 F.2d at 1235 (emphasis added). 
Dore contracted for the right to enter the proposed joint 
venture whereby Dore could obtain fee title to a half interest 
in the mines. It appears obvious that Dore hoped to receive 
more than just return of the $6,000,000.00 plus interest. 
United's failure to tender marketable title made this option 
to enter the joint venture agreement and obtain fee title 
worthless. Where United thus breached its duty to tender 
marketable title, Dore was excused from any duty it may have 
had to extend the $500,000.00 line of credit. Converse v. 
Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1981); Windward Partners v. Lopes, 
3 Haw. App. 30, 640 P.2d 872 (1982); Parsons Supply, Inc. v. 
Smith, 22 Wash. App. 520, 591 P.2d 821 (1979); Rogers v. 
Relyea, 184 Mont. 1, 601 P.2d 37 (1979). 
A second reason why the title insurance did not cure the 
title defects is that the commitment proposed only to insure 
that Bannock Silver Mining Company had title. It said nothing 
21 
about the right or ability of United to compel Bannock to 
convey title to Dore. Although United presented self-serving 
testimony that it had full authority to cause Bannock to 
convey title, that testimony was disputed for reasons shown 
below. Again, it is only the existence of the dispute that is 
relevant, not the correctness of the claim. 
Prior to the formation of the Vipont limited partnership 
between United and Hoffman, United owned only approximately 
16% of the Bannock stock. The remaining 84% of the outstand-
ing stock was purchased by Hoffman as part of his contribution 
to the partnership. (R. 443, f 24.) Paragraph 6 of Plain-
tiff's Second Request for Production of Documents to Defen-
dant requested United to produce "[a]11" stock transfer 
records of Bannock, and all documents reflecting or showing 
the consideration paid or received for shares of Bannock's 
capital stock." In response thereto, United produced a stock 
certificate, issued April 7, 1977, in the name of Paul Hoffman 
for 2,150,000 shares (R. 648-49, 940-41.), and produced vari-
ous other documents which were part of the same transaction. 
There were no documents which indicated that the 2,150,000 
shares had ever been transferred at any time subsequent to 
April 7, 1977, and thus no proof the shares had been validly 
transferred to United. 
In answers to interrogatories, United stated that there 
were 2,560,000 shares of Bannock stock outstanding. (R. 440 
5 11.) United further asserted that it was the owner of all 
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Bannock stock. (R. 440-41, ff 14-15.) The basis for this 
assertion is set forth in the interrogatory answers as fol-
lows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24: 
State whether Paul Hoffman ever 
transferred to Vipont Mines, 
Ltd., the 2,150,000 shares of 
Bannock stock described in 
Section 3.2(a) of the Vipont 
Mines, Ltd., Partnership Agree-
ment, and state the date of the 
transfer and the terms of each 
document evidencing such trans-
fer. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 
24: Hoffman, who acquired the 
shares of stock through the aus-
pices of Miller and who held 
them in trust for United 
Silver's benefit, transferred 
the shares to Vipont on April 
30, 1977. The transfer was 
consistent with the Limited 
Partnership Agreement of April 
30, 1977. When Hoffman failed 
to honor his Subscription Agree-
ment which would have entitled 
him to acquire an interest in 
Vipont, the shares vested in 
United. 
(R. 443.) 
Even if Hoffman was deemed to have transferred the 
Bannock stock to the Vipont partnership, he still claimed a 
lien on the assets of the partnership, including the mine. 
United acknowledged in its trial brief that the trial court in 
the Hoffman litigation ultimately concluded that "Hoffman is 
entitled to a lien on the interest of the general partner 
[United] anrf the partnership in the Vipont Silver Mine proper-
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ty, until those loans (the $436,000.00 fronted by Hoffman) 
have been repaid." (R. 1197.) The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court7s conclusion that Hoffman's invest-
ment was secured by a lien on the general partner's interest 
and on the partnership itself. Hoffmanr 775 P.2d at 139, 140. 
Even assuming, therefore, that the title commitment 
assured the lack of any clouds against the title to the mines, 
the title commitment was silent on the issue of United's right 
or ability to convey that title to Dore. There existed and 
still exists a dispute as to whether United has that right. 
Title was clearly not marketable. 
A final reason why the title commitment was not 
equivalent to marketable title is that the terms of the policy 
itself would appear to except coverage under the circumstances 
of this case. Paragraph 2 of Schedule B of the commitment 
states that the insurance policy to be issued will contain an 
exception for "[a]ny facts, rights, interests, or claims which 
are not shown by the public records but which could be ascer-
tained by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of 
persons in possession thereof." (Exhibit 8.) Dore had made 
inquiry of the party in possession of the land and had learned 
of Hoffman's claim. There would have been at least an argu-
ment (again, certainty is not required) that the title company 
would have contested coverage had Dore made a claim on the 
policy. 
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E. United Did Not Have Clear And Marketable Title To 
The Dumps At Any Time Material Herein. 
Point I above establishes that Dore had attempted to 
exercise the option to enter the joint venture agreement, but 
United breached its covenant to have good and marketable title 
to the subject mining claims. Dore was therefore excused from 
any further obligations under the confirmation agreement, in-
cluding any obligation it may otherwise have had to extend a 
$500,000.00 line of credit to United. 
As is established below, however, even if Dore had volun-
tarily elected, for reasons totally unrelated to any fault or 
breach on the part of United, to not exercise its option to 
enter into the joint venture agreement, Dore would still have 
had no obligation to extend the $500,000.00 line of credit to 
United. 
United's claim for a line of credit is based upon para-
graph 5(c) of the confirmation agreement. That paragraph 
provides that the line of credit was to be established, if at 
all, only "upon presentation to Dore of title to [the A-level 
and Phelan] dumps as collateral . . . ." The dumps consist of 
refuse piles from earlier mining operations which with modern 
mineral recovery methods may now be economically valuable. 
The cases cited at pages 15 to 17 of this brief establish that 
the term "title" must be construed to mean and refer to clear 
and marketable title, free of all liens and encumbrances, free 
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from reasonable doubt as to its validity, and free from the 
hazard of present or potential litigation. 
In addition to the circumstances described in the previ-
ous sections of this Point I regarding title to the subject 
mining claims, all of which applies with equal force to the 
dumps, there were additional claims against the dumps only. 
Paragraph 4.1 of the Hoffman partnership agreement stated that 
the parties anticipated processing the tailings and dumps, and 
provided that all net revenues realized from the processing of 
the tailings and dumps were to be distributed 20% to United 
and the first $350,000.00 of the remaining 80% to be retained 
by the partnership to assist in financing the Phase I develop-
ment, with any amounts over $350,000.00 to be applied to 
paying off the contributions to the partnership made by 
Hoffman. 
It is clear that at all material times herein Hoffman 
claimed an interest in Vipont Mines, Ltd., and in and to any 
income which was produced from the dumps or tailings by any 
party. Hoffman's claims were the subject of actual pending 
litigation at all material times hereto. The validity of 
those claims had not, at least through the time of trial, been 
finally determined by any court of competent jurisdiction. 
Title to the dumps and tailings was, therefore, unmarketable 
at all materials times hereto and Dore had no obligation to 
extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to United. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT UNITED WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY PEES FOR 
SUCCESSFULLY RESISTING DORE'S CLAIM FOR RESCISSION. 
United argues on pages 22-25 of its brief that it is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for successfully defend-
ing Dore's claim for rescission of the confirmation agreement. 
The question of the legal effect to be given to the un-
ambiguous terms of the contract is a question of law to be 
reviewed by this court for correctness. 50 West Broadway 
Associates v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 
1989) . 
In support of its argument that a claim for rescission is 
an action on a contract, United cites three cases: Ayotte v. 
Redmon, 110 Idaho 726, 718 P.2d 1164 (1986); Hastings v. 
Matlock, 171 Cal. App. 3d 826, 217 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1985); 
Preston v. McDonnell. 203 Mont. 64, 659 P.2d 276 (1983). 
However persuasive these cases may be in their own jurisdic-
tions, they do not accurately represent the law of Utah. In 
BLT Investment Co. v. Snow. 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1978), the 
Utah Supreme Court squarely held that an action for rescission 
is not an action on a contract, and that attorney fees may not 
be awarded based on the contract. Accord, Quealy v. Anderson. 
714 P.2d 667 (Utah 1986). 
The district court properly determined that Dore's claim 
for rescission was not a claim "to enforce the provisions" of 
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the contract, and that United was not entitled to recover its 
attorney fees incurred in resisting the claim. 
POINT III 
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARDED TO DORE ON ITS SUCCESSFUL 
DEFENSE OF UNITED'S CLAIM FOR A LINE OF CREDIT 
WAS NOT UNREASONABLY HIGH. 
On pages 25 and 26 of its brief, United challenges the 
attorney fee awarded to Dore for its successful defense of 
United's contract-based damage claim for Dore's refusal to 
grant a line of credit. "The calculation of reasonable attor-
ney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear 
abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
United offers no evidence in support of its challenge to 
the award of attorney fees, but only offers the conclusion 
that the award "would certainly seem to be totally dispropor-
tionate to the effort involved." (United's brief at 25.) 
United's challenge to the attorney fee must be denied because 
United has not marshalled the evidence which supports the fee, 
Scharf v. BMG Corp. . 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), and 
there is no such evidence. Absent some admissible evidence, 
there is no basis on which this court could determine that the 
fee is disproportionate to the effort involved. An attorney 
fee award is not improper merely because it greatly exceeds 
the fees incurred by the opposing party, Dixie State Bank v. 
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Bracken, 764 P.2d at 987, nor because the fee is high compared 
with the amount recovered. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 
625 (Utah 1985). 
Dore argues in the following point that the fee awarded 
was actually far less than a reasonable fee, and that this 
case should be remanded for an award of an additional attorney 
fee. There clearly is no evidence presented to this court 
which would justify a determination that the fee was exces-
sive. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OP DORE'S ATTORNEY PEE 
CLAIM WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Dore incurred attorney fees of over $170,000.00 (R. 1437, 
1499.), and Dore,s counsel represented to the trial court that 
at least 75 to 80% of that was incurred in defending United's 
claim for damages related to the denial of the $500,000.00 
line of credit. (Tr. Feb. 22, 1989, at pp 52, 55, 70.) The 
trial court awarded a fee of only $29,853.00. Dore asserts 
that the reduction in the fee was not supported by the evi-
dence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. The calculation 
of the award is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear 
abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985 (Utah 1988). 
The only evidence concerning attorney fees was that con-
tained in the affidavits of counsel submitted to the trial 
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court. The affidavits submitted by Dore contained a detailed 
day-by-day listing of the services performed, together with 
testimony of the necessity of the work performed and the 
reasonableness of the fee charged. At oral argument on the 
attorney fee issue, the trial court inquired of Dore's counsel 
how much of the fees were related to the defense of United7s 
claim for damages arising from denial of the $500,000.00 line 
of credit. Dore's counsel unequivocally replied that at least 
7 0 to 80% of the fees were incurred in that portion of the 
case. Dore's counsel further explained that the fees on that 
issue included responding to United's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting Dore's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
responding to United's challenge to the form of summary judg-
ment and the Order Determining Uncontroverted Facts and 
Conclusions of Law, and in responding to United's attempt on 
the eve of trial, before a new district judge, to seek recon-
sideration and vacation of the prior grant of summary judg-
ment. (Tr. Feb. 22, 1989, at pp. 48-52.) 
In determining the fee award, the trial court noted that 
there was "no real contest between the parties relative to the 
reasonableness of the hourly fees." (R. 1559.) The court 
then estimated an appropriate fee by making several assump-
tions and observations: (1) the summary judgment motions 
filed by both parties were, for the most part, directed at 
defending against United's counterclaim; (2) although some 
efforts were expended after the grant of summary judgment in 
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resisting United's renewed efforts to challenge the summary 
judgment, most of the post-summary judgment time was expended 
in trial preparation; (3) approximately 500 hours of attorney 
time was spent between February, 1985, when defendant filed 
its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and August, 1986, 
when the hearing on summary judgment was held; and (4) the 
"court cannot determine the exact number of hours spent ex-
clusively [in defense of the counterclaim], but it would be 
safe to find that at least one-half thereof applied." (R. 
1559.) 
The trial court then proceeded to award Dore one-half of 
the attorney fees incurred from February, 1985 through August, 
1986. It follows that the trial court awarded no fees what-
soever for the acknowledged efforts in defending United's 
renewed efforts just before trial to challenge the summary 
judgment. 
Dore appreciates that it would have required some effort 
on the part of the trial court to make a more precise deter-
mination of the time spent in defense of the counterclaim.6 
That the job was difficult is not, however, an excuse for 
Had Dore known in advance of the ruling that the trial 
court would segregate the various aspects of the case in the 
manner which it did, Dore could have performed a detailed and 
accurate allocation of the fees for the trial court. Dore did 
not have that opportunity because it had no advance notice that 
the trial court would segregate the categories of fees as it 
did. 
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failing to perform the task, nor does it justify engaging in 
the gross generalizations made by the trial court. 
The magnitude of the trial court's error may be ap-
preciated by considering the time isolated by the trial court, 
that between February, 1985 and August, 1986. The trial court 
stated that it could not determine the exact number of hours 
spent in defending the counterclaim, but that it was at least 
half of the time. The actual percentage was in excess of 78%. 
Attached to this brief as Appendix "J" is a copy of the pages 
of Dore's attorney fee affidavit relating to the February, 
1985 to August, 1986 time. The hours which were clearly spent 
in defense of the counterclaim have been circled. All un-
related time is excluded, as well as a substantial portion of 
time which arguably was spent in defense of the counterclaim. 
For example, excluded is all time spent in responding to 
United's discovery and in preparing discovery to United, even 
though a large part of the discovery directly addressed the 
counterclaim issues. (R. 54-327, 436-612, 614-783.) Also 
excluded is time spent prior to February 1985 in responding to 
United's discovery addressed to the counterclaim, (R. 279-
3 03) , as well as the time spent responding to the motions on 
the eve of trial. The total of the hours from February 1985 
to August 1986 appear on the chart following the affidavit 
pages in Appendix MJ." This simple computation shows that at 
least 78% of the time in this period was spent in defending 
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the counterclaim; if the related discovery were included, the 
percentage would probably be closer to 95%. 
The trial court7s arbitrary award of only one-half of the 
fees during the critical time period is not supported by the 
evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. In addition, 
the trial court did not even purport to make an award of fees 
for the efforts on the eve of trial, although the court ac-
knowledged that the efforts were performed and that they 
related to the defense of the counterclaim. This case should 
be remanded to the trial court with instructions to hold an 
evidentiary hearing and to make an appropriate award of attor-
ney fees based on the evidence. 
This court has previously held that "a trial court abuses 
its discretion in awarding less than the amount of the attor-
ney fees requested when there is adequate and uncontroverted 
evidence in the record to support those fees unless the court 
offers an explanation for the reduction considering the 
factors previously discussed." Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. 
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted, 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The court must make findings to 
support the award, and the award may be reversed if the find-
ings do not adequately explain the basis for the award. Id. 
The instant case fits squarely within this rule. Dore 
offered adequate and uncontroverted evidence of its attorney 
fees. The trial court did not purport to reduce the fees 
based on any feeling that the fees were unreasonable, but only 
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to limit the fees to those incurred in defending the counter-
claim. The trial court made no specific findings, but only 
broad generalizations. The award is plainly contrary to the 
uncontroverted evidence. The case should be remanded with 
instructions to the trial court to make specific findings and 
increase the fee to that supported by the evidence. 
POINT V 
UNITED WAS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR SUMS 
PAID FOR PURCHASE OF TIMBER. 
United was required to perform the work under the confir-
mation agreement on a cost-only basis. Dore promptly paid the 
bills submitted by United, but subsequently asserted, after a 
more detailed review, that many of the items were not justi-
fied or properly documented. Dore was entitled to recover for 
those payments upon proof that the charge was clearly in-
appropriate. E.g. , Speckert v. Bunker Hill Arizona Mining 
Co. , 6 Wash. 2d 39, 106 P.2d 602, 603 (1940). The trial 
court's factual determination on this issue will be reversed 
only if clearly erroneous, i.e., the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view 
of the law. Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P. 2d 1046, 1048 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). Where the underlying facts are undisputed or 
are stipulated, this court will review for correctness. 
Richfield v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The trial court correctly observed that $43,000.00 was 
expended by United for timber "which never left the lumber 
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yard and was not used on the project." (R. 1426-27.) The 
trial court concluded that plaintiff was possibly at fault in 
failing to ensure that the timber was used on the project, and 
that the timber was in any event now worthless. The trial 
court misperceived the critical issue, which is that United 
purchased and charged Dore for other timber which was used on 
the project, and which would not have been necessary had the 
$43,000.00 in timber been used. 
The confirmation agreement included a provision requiring 
Dore to "pay to United $43,000.00 as a non-refundable payment 
to be used to purchase timber for the A-level rehabilitation 
and for the Miller cross cut." (Exhibit 2, f 4(a).) The 
undisputed evidence showed that United purchased other timber 
for use on the A-level rehabilitation. (Tr. 276.) Although 
the $43,000.00 was by contract non-refundable, it does not 
follow that it was a gift. The timber purchased with the 
$43,000.00 was specifically earmarked "for use on the A-level 
rehabilitation and the Miller cross cut." United admittedly 
did not use the timber on the A-level rehabilitation, and 
instead purchased other timber and charged Dore for it. It 
allowed the $43,000.00 worth of timber to go to waste. United 
should accordingly reimburse Dore for the timber purchased, 
and this case should be remanded with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Dore for $43,000.00. 
POINT VI 
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THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARD IN 
RULING ON DORE'S PRAYER FOR RESCISSION. 
Dore asserted that it was entitled to rescind the confir-
mation agreement and recover the payments it had made pursuant 
to the agreementf because of United's breach of its obligation 
to provide marketable title. Dore presented testimony that it 
would not have entered into the agreement had it been aware of 
the scope of the Hoffman claims. (Tr. 151.) The breach was 
of such a magnitude that it defeated the very purpose of the 
contract, entitling Dore to rescind the contract. Polyqlycoat 
Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979); Berqstrom v. 
Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1225 (Utah 1984). The trial court 
concluded, however, that Dore was not entitled to seek rescis-
sion because it went forward with the confirmation project 
after learning of the Hoffman claim. 
Initially, the trial court does not specify when it be-
lieved that Dore knew or could have discovered of the nature 
of Hoffman's claims. Dore presented evidence that it did not 
know the extent of the claims until October 15, 1981, after 
the confirmation project was well underway. United had pre-
viously provided assurances that the Hoffman claims were of no 
moment and continues to argue that position. 
Even assuming, however, that Dore had knowledge of the 
Hoffman claims in time to have ceased work on the confirmation 
project, it does not follow that rescission was not available. 
In Breur-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1990), the court addressed a very similar situation where a 
party involved in a contract learned of an encumbrance which 
clouded title and destroyed the purpose of the contract, 
unless the encumbrance were to be removed. The other party 
promised to cure the defect or to make other arrangements to 
compensate for it, and attempted to do so for a period of over 
five years. When the efforts proved unsuccessful, the plain-
tiff sought to rescind the contract based on the defendant7s 
anticipatory breach. The defendants contested the rescission 
claim, arguing that it had been waived by the continued per-
formance after knowledge of the grounds for rescission. The 
court held as follows: 
An original feature of the 
English doctrine of anticipatory 
breach was that a party contin-
uing performance in the face of 
an anticipatory repudiation 
thereby waives the repudiation 
and can only sue on a subsequent 
breach, if any, occurring at the 
time when performance is due. 
[Citation] The modern rule, 
however, "is that an innocent 
party, confronted with an an-
ticipatory repudiation, may con-
tinue to treat the contract as 
operable and urge performance by 
the repudiating party without 
waiving any right to sue for 
that repudiation." [Citations.] 
The basis for the modern 
rule, as the Combes point out in 
their reply brief, is to give 
the breaching party the oppor-
tunity to cure the breach before 
the time for performance is due. 
A party that has received a 
37 
definite repudiation from the 
breaching party to the contract 
should not be penalized for its 
efforts to encourage the breach-
ing party to perform its end of 
the bargain. [Citation.] The 
repudiating party has a power of 
retraction as long as there has 
been no substantial change of 
position by the injured party 
and the non-breaching party,s 
continuing to urge performance 
may be properly held to keep 
this power of retraction alive. 
[Citation.] 
799 P.2d at 725-26 (citations omitted). 
The instant case is strikingly similar to the facts of 
Breur-Harrison. The evidence would support a conclusion that 
Dore did not discover the true nature of Hoffman's claims 
until it was already well into the confirmation project. By 
mutual agreement, the parties extended the time within which 
United was required to tender marketable title, in order to 
give United an opportunity to work out the title problems. 
Dore should not be penalized for this effort at conciliation. 
The trial court made its ruling based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the law. Although its ruling is largely 
discretionary, where it was based on an erroneous interpreta-
tion of the law, Dore is entitled to a reversal to have the 
trial court reconsider its determination in light of the 
Breur-Harrison standard. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 
859 (Utah 1979); Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State ex rel R. R. v. C. R. . 797 P.2d 459 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
POINT VII 
UNITED SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
The trial court properly held that Dore was entitled to 
recover its attorney fees incurred in defending United's 
counterclaim. Dore has incurred additional fees on appeal in 
defense of the counterclaim. This case should be remanded 
with instructions to award Dore a reasonable attorney fee for 
its defense of the counterclaim on appeal. Management 
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-
09 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment dismissing United7s counterclaim for 
damages for denial of the $500,000.00 line of credit should be 
affirmed. A condition precedent to the obligation to extend 
the line of credit was United7s tender of marketable title to 
the mines. United did not tender marketable title because 
there existed a present and existing adverse claim, or at the 
minimum, a real threat of an adverse claim. 
The denial of attorney fees to United on its defense of 
Dore's claim for rescission should be affirmed. Utah law 
clearly establishes that a claim for rescission does not arise 
out of a contract. 
The attorney fee award to Dore for its successful defense 
of United's counterclaim should be reversed and remanded with 
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instructions to increase the award in accordance with the 
evidence. Alternatively, the award should be affirmed, be-
cause the evidence supported at least the amount of the award 
given. 
The case should be remanded to the trial court with in-
structions to award to Dore $43,000.00 for sums paid during 
the confirmation project for the purchase of timber. Although 
the $4 3,000.00 paid to United was labeled non-refundable, the 
timber so purchased was to have been used in the confirmation 
project, and Dore should not have been charged for the pur-
chase of additional timber. 
Finally, Dore's claim for rescission should be remanded 
to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the Breur-
Harrison standard. 
Dore is further entitled to an award of cittorney fees for 
its continued defense of United7s counterclaim on this appeal. 
DATED this /7 ^  day of December, 1990. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to each of the following, postage pre-
paid, this day of December, 1990. 
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq. 
Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Webb 
155 Second Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
Roger F. Baron, Esq. 
Bunderson and Baron 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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Memorandum Decis ion 
(on motions for p a r t i a l suinmary judgmenl 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING 
CORPORATION, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., 
a Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 18093 
Each party hereto has moved for summary judgment and supported 
the same by affidavits, documents, answers to interrogatories and 
memoranda. 
The central issue involves title to mining properties including 
patented claims and dumps. Two contracts are involved, the confirma-
tion agreement, to give Dore the right to prove ore reserves on 
Unitedfs mining property, hopefully - 1,000,00f ounces of recoverable 
silver, with 100,000 ounces expected in the dumps. The second contract 
was a joint venture agreement which would, if exercised, result in 
each party owing fifty (50%) percent of the mining properties. The 
joint venture agreement was not executed and execution thereof depended 
on the confirmation agreement. 
Both parties in their briefs seem to recognize that United would 
have to produce marketable title to the mining properties. United 
claims the title insurance commitment, the preliminary injunction of
 Al* 
the Idaho District Court and the release of lis pendens ordered by 
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the Idaho Court satisfied the requirements of marketability and there-
fore the failure of Dore to execute and perform the joint venture 
agreement obligated Dore to provide a $500,000.00 line of credit to 
United according to the terms of the confirmation agreement. 
Dore argues, there is a pending law suit before the Idaho Court 
by Paul Hoffman under his agreements with United, asserting a twenty-
five (25%) percent present interest in and an option to obtain fifty 
(50%) percent interest in the same mining properties involved in the 
instant law suit. Dore further argues the preliminary injunction by the 
Idaho Court is in effect only pending disposition of the law suit on 
its merits, and therefore United is unable and has failed to tender 
marketable title thus freeing Dore from obligation to provide the 
$500,000.00 line of credit, and also to entitle Dore to recision of 
the confirmation contract. 
The court recognizes that there is some correspondence between 
United and one Friedrich, the chairman and president of LLC Corporation, 
the parent company of Dore and some of the answers in Friedrichfs 
deposition, which indicate LLC would require a title insurance policy 
thus leading United to believe the title insurance commitment satisfied 
the title requirements. However, neither the correspondence nor the 
deposition are in any way conclusive on the matter and Friedrich points 
out in his deposition that what was thought to be an action for an 
accounting by Hoffman was later learned to be a claim for twenty-five 
(25%) to fifty (50%) percent of the properties themselves. Further, 
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Friedrich was discharged by LLC prior to the determination of Dore 
through LLC not to execute the joint venture agreement. 
Both parties cite Kipahulu Investment Company vs. Seltzer 675 P 
2nd 778 (Hawaii) which recognizes that title insurance is not necessarily 
equivalent to marketability. United argues that the facts therein 
involving potential subdivision property with probable improvements 
exceeding the value of the insurance policy made the case inapplicable 
upon its facts to the present case. However, this court sees considerable 
similarity in continuing expenditures and improvements and anticipated 
ore production of mining property to the anticipated improvements and 
profits from a subdivision venture. Title insurance covering the 
initial outlay may not be adequate to cover the ultimate expenditures 
in the development of a mine. 
The court further finds and concludes the parties contemplated 
marketable title, free and clear of liens or encumbrances and reasonable 
certainty of freedom from law suits. Here a lawsuit presently exists 
under documents which may entitle the litigant to a lien on the property 
and to eighty (80%) percent of the net proceeds from the processing of 
the dumps and tailings. Accordingly defendant's motion for summary 
judgment compelling plaintiff to furnish $500,000.00 line of credit to 
defendant should be denied. That part of plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment adjudicating no obligation on plaintiff to provide such 
$500,000.00 line of credit should be granted. 
The nature of the confirmation contract and the considerable 
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performance thereunder, particularly noting the knowledge of Dore before 
entering into the transaction that some claim was being asserted by 
Hoffman, lead the court to the conclusion that recision of the confirma-
tion contract as contained in the other part of plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment would not be justified and that part of plaintifffs 
motion for summary judgment should also be denied* 
Plaintiff to prepare and submit the appropriate findings and order. 
Dated this _J*^ day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
•OMER^J. CALL-DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this J^_ll_day 
of April, 1986, to Ray G. Martineau, Esq., 1800 Beneficial Life Tower, 
36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
and to Lloyd J. Webb, Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine, 155 Second 
Avenue North, Box 1768, Twin Falls, Idaho 83303, Attorney for defendant. 
Jay R. Hirschi 
Box Elder County Clerk 
By WYLtLKt' ^ • /T^^^rA^* 
fT Deputy Q 
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Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and 
Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
r 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C, 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
THOMAS H. CHURCH 
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW 
1354 Albion Avenue 
P. 0. Box 1286 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Telephone: (208) 678-9088 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING ] 
CORPORATION, a corporation, \ 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., ] 
a corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
) ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 18093 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Defendant's Motion") filed herein dated February 14, 1985, 
and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Plaintiff's Motion") filed herein dated July 26, 1985, came 
on regularly before the above-entitled Court for hearing on 
March 12, 1986, the plaintiff appearing by and through its 
/ & & - . 6"<? 
V i C R O F I L M E D 20 
^ ^ W 3 
attorneys, Ray G. Martineau, Leslie W. Slaugh, and Thomas H. 
Church, and the defendant appearing by and through its attor-
ney, Lloyd J. Webb, and by and through its president, Thomas F. 
Miller, and the Court having carefully reviewed and considered 
the memoranda, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, the entire 
record on file herein, and the Court having previously issued 
its Memorandum Decision and entered its Order Determining 
Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law herein and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed herein 
dated February 14, 1985 may be and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed herein dated July 25, 1985 which seeks an adju-
dication that plaintiff had no obligation to provide a 
$500,000.00 line of credit to defendant may be and the same is 
hereby granted. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that Count I of defendant's Counterclaim filed herein dated 
April 11, 1985, may be and the same is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
-2-
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that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff is entitled 
to a decree rescinding the Vipont Confirmation Project 
Agreement be and the same %s hereby denied. 
DATED this rfjP "day of May, 1986. 
BY/£flE /COURT 
District ,<j£rage 
Certificate of Service 
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of 
Partial Summary Judgment and Order on Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment to the following on this 7 day of May, 
1986: 
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq. 
Webb, Burton, Carlson & Pedersen 
155 2nd Avenue North 
P.O. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
^•>?7« 
Order Determining Uncontroverted Facts 
and Conclusions of Law 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C. 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
THOMAS H. CHURCH 
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW 
1354 Albion Avenue 
P. 0. Box 1286 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Telephone: (208) 678-9088 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DETERMINING 
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 18093 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed 
herein dated February 14, 1985, and Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment filed herein dated July 26, 1985, came 
on regularly before the above-entitled Court for hearing on 
March 12, 1986, the plaintiff appearing by and through its 
attorneys, Ray G. Martineau, Leslie W. Slaugh, and Thomas H. 
¥1 
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Church, and the defendant appearing by and through its attor-
ney, Lloyd J. Webb, and by and through its president, Thomas F. 
Miller, and the Court having carefully reviewed and considered 
the memoranda, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, the entire 
record on file herein, and the arguments and statements of 
counsel, and the Court having previously issued its Memorandum 
Decision herein indicating that Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment should be denied, that the portion of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which seeks an 
adjudication that plaintiff had no obligation to provide a 
$500,000.00 line of credit to defendant should be granted, and 
that the portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff is entitled 
to a decree rescinding the Vipont Confirmation Project should 
be denied, and it therefore appearing that judgment has not 
been rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked 
for by the parties and that a trial is necessary for the proper 
disposition of all remaining issues, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, now 
finds, makes and enters the following order: 
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. 56(d), that the following relevant facts appear 
to be without substantial controversy: 
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1. On or about May 28, 1981 , the parties hereto 
entered into a certain written agreement entitled Vipont 
Confirmation Project Agreement ("Confirmation Agreement"), to 
which was attached and made a part thereof by reference a 
form of document entitled "Vipont Joint Venture Agreement" 
("Joint Venture Agreement"). 
2. The Joint Venture Agreement contemplated the 
possible investment and expenditure by plaintiff of very 
substantial sums of money (potentially a sum well in excess of 
$6,000,000,00) in connection with the development, exploitation 
and operation of the mining properties and related interests 
("Mining Properties") which were the subject of the 
Confirmation Agreement and the Joint Venture Agreement. 
3. The Confirmation Agreement provides in Paragraph 
5 as follows: 
In the event that Dore does not exercise the 
option to enter into the joint venture 
according to the terms of agreement thereof, 
on or before October 15, 1981: 
(c) Dore must grant United a $500,000 line 
of credit for five (5) years secured by the 
A-level and Phelan dumps if the sampling and 
measurement activity on those dumps confirms 
at least 100,000 ounces of silver. Said 
confirmation activity must be completed 
within four (4) weeks of the date of this 
agreement and the line of credit established 
upon presentation to Dore of title to said 
dumps as collateral and the consultants 
report confirming 100,000 ounces of silver. 
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4. The sampling and measurement activity as to the A-
level and Phelan dumps called for by the Confirmation Agreement 
was ultimately completed and confirmed the presence at least 
100,000 ounces of silver. 
5. The option granted to plaintiff under the 
Confirmation Agreement to enter into the Joint Venture 
Agreement was extended from time to time by mutual agreement of 
the parties and ultimately expired on February 3, 1983. 
6. Prior to February 3, 1983, defendant delivered to 
plaintiff a cetrain Commitment for Title Insurance isued by 
Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Company of Brigham City, Utah 
in the proposed insurance amount of $6,000,000.00, covering the 
title to the mining claims compromising a portion of the Mining 
Properties, subject to those certain restrictions and exclu-
sions listed therein. 
7. Defendant made demand on plaintiff for plaintiff 
to extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to defendant but plain-
tiff has failed and refused to extend any credit to defendant. 
8. Record title to the Mining Properties was at all 
material times herein vested in Bannock Silver Mining Company 
subject to certain easements, restrictions, and encumbrances of 
record, and at no material time herein was any portion of the 
record title to the Mining Properties vested in defendant. 
9. Plaintiff had actual knowledge prior to October 
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15, 1981, of the pendancy of that certain civil action entitled 
Paul Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc., Civil No. 
13069-12-80, filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Cassia County, State of Idaho ("Hoffman Action"). 
10. Documents filed in the Hoffman Action reveal 
that on or about April 30, 1977, defendant and Paul Hoffman 
("Hoffman") executed a certain Limited Partnership Agreement-
Vipont Mines Ltd. and a Financing Agreement ("Partnership 
Agreements"). 
11. Hoffman has asserted in the Hoffman Action that he 
contributed some substantial sums of money to the limited part-
nership which is evidenced by the Partnership Agreements and 
that he is entitled pursuant to the terms of the Partnership 
Agreements to a 25% interest in and the right to acquire a 50% 
interest in said limited partnership. 
12. Hoffman has further asserted in the Hoffman 
Action, and the Partnership Agreements support, if not compel, 
an adjudication that Hoffman has a valid lien upon the Mining 
Properties and a claim to 80% of the net proceeds realized from 
the processing of the dumps and tailings which compromise a 
portion of the Mining Properties, to repay the contributions 
made by Hoffman to said limited partnership. 
14. The Hoffman Action has at all material times 
herein been, remained and still is pending and unresolved. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the 
Court hereby makes and enters the following conclusions of law: 
1. Defendant was required to tender marketable title 
to the Mining Properties to plaintiff as a condition precedent 
to any obligation on the part of plaintiff to extend any line 
of credit to defendant. 
2. Marketable title under the circumstances of this 
case required that the title to the Mining Properties be free 
and clear of all liens or encumbrances and free from any 
threatened or pending litigation that might adversely affect 
plaintiff's interest in the Mining Properties, 
3. Title insurance coverage covering the potential 
initial outlay by plaintiff might not afford plaintiff adequate 
protection with respect to the ultimate expenditures and/or 
investment which plaintiff might make in connection with its 
potential ownership interest in the Mining Properties. 
4. A commitment for title insurance is not equivalent 
to marketable title under the circumstances of this case, the 
Court being persuaded in this regard by the holding and 
rationale of Kipahulu Investment Co. v. Seltzer Partnership, 675 
P.2d 778 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983). 
5. The pendency of the Hoffman Action and the claims 
asserted by Hoffman in connection therewith rendered the title 
to the Mining Properties unmarketable insofar as plaintiff is 
concerned. 
6. Plaintiff has at no time had any obligation to 
extend a $500,000.00 line of credit to defendant for the reason 
that defendant failed to provide or tender to plaintiff good 
and marketable title to the Mining Properties, which tender was 
a condition precedent to any obligation on the part of plaintiff 
to extend any line of credit to defendant. 
7. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
filed herein dated February 14, 1985, should be denied. 
8. That portion of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment filed herein dated July 25, 1985, which seeks 
an adjudication that plaintiff had no obligation to provide a 
$500,000.00 line of credit to defendant should be granted. 
9. Count I of United's Counterclaim filed herein 
dated April 11, 1985, should be dismissed with prejudice. 
10. There exists a agenuine issue of material fact as 
to the nature and extent of plaintiff's knowledge and notice of 
Hoffman's claim which might preclude plaintiff from rescinding 
the Confirmation Agreement after there was considerable perfor-
mance thereunder by the parties hereto. 
11. That portion of Plaintiff Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment which seeks an adjudication that plaintiff is 
entitled to a decree rescinding the Confirmation Agreement 
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should be denied, / / 
DATED this SLO day of May, 1986, 
BY^XHE COURT: 
-OMER J. CA 
Certificate of Service 
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of Order 
Specifying Facts that Appear Without Substantial Controversy to 
the following on this *7 day of May, 1986: 
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq. 
Webb, Burton, Carlson & Pedersen 
155 2nd Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
^ . #>?*-**</* "*%>*% ' C C t^i.i«* ^mm 
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(on matters litigated at trial) 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING CORP., ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ; 
UNITED SILVER MINES INC., ] 
Defendants. ] 
| MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| FILE NO. 830018093 
In this matter the Plaintiff filed suit seeking relief 
essentially by way of recission of a contract and restitution 
of certain property and expenses. The Defendant 
counter-claimed, alleging that the Plaintiff was obligated to 
provide a line of credit and or payment of certain storage 
fees. 
The Suit arose from an agreement executed by and 
between the parties May 28, 1981, called "Vipont Confirmation 
Agreement" to which was attached and made a part by reference, 
a document entitled Vipont Joint Venture Agreement. The 
"Confirmation Agreement" provided among other things that a 
certain ore confirmation activities would occur at the expense 
of the Plaintiff to determine the quality, or quantity of ore 
deposits in the specific mining properties. If it was 
determined that a certain amount of silver then existed on the 
properties, then the "Joint Venture Agreement" attached to and 
made part of the Confirmation Agreement, in form of an option^^^j^j^^ 
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could be exercised by the Plaintiff requiring the infusion and 
investment of certain funds by the Plaintiff in developing the 
mining properties. The Plaintiff would thereby obtain an 
interest therein. Further if the option (Joint Venture 
Agreement) were not executed then plaintiff was to provide to 
the Defendant a $500,000.00 line of credit in exchange for 
certain collateral. This Court on May 20th, 1986, made 
findings and conclusions; and issued an Order therefrom. 
The Court need not reiterate those findings and 
conclusions, but suffice to say that they became the law of 
the case and were not altered by motions made to the 
contrary. The Plaintiff by said Order was releived of its 
obligation to extend the $500,000.00 line of credit to the 
Defendant for the reason that the Defendant failed to provide 
or tender to the Plaintiff marketable title. Therein further 
the Court granted the Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment, 
releiving it of the obligation to provide the $500,000.00 line 
of credit. 
By Judge Call's ruling there remained for trial as to 
whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the Plaintiffs knowledge of or notice of the prior claim 
against the Defendant or the subject properties thereby 
precluding the Plaintiff from recinding the Confirmation 
Agreement after considerable performance by the parties had 
-3-
occured. This Court concludes that the Plaintiff was aware 
and could have become more aware of the extent of the 
(Hoffman) claim and its effect on the properties, the 
Defendants ability to perform under the Contract; and the 
weakness in the marketability of the title -to the properties 
to be provided as collateral for the $500,000.00 line of 
credit, or upon execution of the "Joint Venture Agreement", 
the viability of the title to the properties in question. 
Despite that, hoping for the best, the Plaintiff proceeded 
with the confirmation project and explored the mine's 
potential. In October 1981, it became apparent to the 
Plaintiff that the Defendant could not provide clear and 
marketabale title, thereby releiving the Plaintiff of further 
obligations including the requirement to extend the $500,00.00 
line of credit. 
This Court finds specifically however that there was 
sufficient evidence that despite actual knowledge of or 
knowledge that could have reasonably been accumulated and 
acquired by the Plaintiff regarding the Hoffman claim, the 
Plaintiff neverless went ahead with the confirmation project 
under the agreement, thereby here precluding the Plaintiff 
from seeking or obtaining recission of the Confirmation 
Agreement. The monies expended legitimately in connection 
with the Confirmation Agreement were spent with knowledge of 
or with the ability to gain knowledge of the extent of the 
Hoffman claims and were spent in view of that risk. When it 
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became apparent that the Defendant could not produce a 
marketable title, the Plaintiff had no further obligation 
under the contract and in fact decided not to exercise its 
option of the "Joint Venture Agreement". The option period 
was extended for approximately three years during which 
further negotiations took place and during which the 
defendant attempted to obtain marketeable title or a policy 
of title insurance. Though such a policy was obtained, it was 
not to the satisfaction of the Plaintiff and for that reason 
and perhaps others the Plaintiff decided not to exercise its 
option to execute the "Joint Venture Agreement". 
There remain issues relative to the Defendant's claimed 
lein, charges for storage and over-payments expended by the 
Plaintiff. With respect thereto the Court finds that the 
Defendant is not entitled to any storage costs, as the storage 
of the equipment occurred during the negotiation by the 
parties and for their mutual benefit in trying to reach a 
point at which the "Joint Venture" or some other agreement 
could be executed. 
The Court finds no basis for the claim made by the 
Defendant for the storage costs and finds no legal basis for 
the Defendant's claim of lien on the stored property. The 
Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment for the bond costs related 
thereto in the sum of $3,600.00 as shown on Exhibit no. 33. 
Although the Court has found that there is no basis for 
recission in this case as the Plaintiff went ahead with its 
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project despite the knowledge or the reasonably ascertainable 
knowledge of the extent of the Hoffman claims, the Court finds 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendant, 
sums proved to have been paid to the Defendant on account of 
billings which over-stated the actual and legitimate costs. 
In that regard the contract provides that the expense to Dore 
Metals of the Confirmation Agreement was to be on a "cost only 
basis". Defendant has argued that by some principal of law, 
unclear to the Court, that the Plaintiff waived any claim for 
recovery of those costs by way of payment and or failure to 
make a claim immediately upon presentation. This Court finds 
however that no waiver occurred and that the Plaintiff is not 
estopped at this time from claiming the repayment for those 
sums which can be clearly shown to be beyond the actual or 
reasonable costs incurred. 
The first item in that regard is found on page two of 
the contract, paragraph 4, subparagrpah (a), wherein the 
Plaintiff was to provide to the Defendant a sum of $43,000.00 
to buy timber for rehabilitation of the A-Level and for the 
Miller cross cut. There was some confusion by the testimony 
as to just what work was done on the Miller cross-cut and or 
the A-Level as related to this provision. There is little 
question that certain work was done, that timber was purchased 
and used and in addition thereto, the $43,000.00 was supplied 
and timber purchased which never left the lumber yard and was 
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not used on the project. Just whose responsibility it was to 
use the timber on the project is unknown and why other timber 
was purchased in addition to the $43,000.00 amount is also 
unknown. It would appear however that the Plaintiff and or 
its agent, Marsten was as much at fault in not seeing that the 
$43,000.00 worth of timber was used in the cross-cut instead 
of additional timber as was the Defendant. Further it would 
appear that the $43,000.00 worth of timber though purchased, 
is now of little or no value either to the mine operation or 
otherwise; therefore the Court makes no order of restitution 
with respect to said claim. 
The Plaintiff also presented testimony relative to 
certain sums to which the Defendant had little or no 
explanation or documentation. The sums claimed are not 
readily verifiable. Exhibit no. 28 lists eight seperate sums 
claimed as having been paid in excess of the Plaintiff's 
contractual obligation. 
The Court has reviewed the exhibits, particulary 
Exhibit no. 25, 26, 28, and 39, and the testimony in regard to 
the charges, expenses and disputes related thereto. 
Item 1. $43,000.00 advance for timber purchase to be 
used on the A-Level and miller cross-cut, the Court 
already addressed. 
Item 2. Advance against billings of $25,000.00. That 
sum by the testimony appeared to be a loan directly to 
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Miller and not part of the K. No direct claim is here 
made for the same against Miller and the Court makes no 
award thereon. 
Item 3. The $61,754.00 is comprised of those sums 
claimed under Exhibit no. 26. Most of the items found 
therein were contested on the basis that no 
satisfactory documentation was produced or that in the 
opinion of Marsten, the charges were unreasonablly 
high. Some items were claimed to be for the defendant 
Miller's own use; unrelated to the project or for 
personal property purchased for and retained by the 
Defendants. Even when bolstered by testimony from 
Marsten, the Court finds the evidence insufficient to 
order reimbursement except as to the following: 
1. Under Paragraph 6 of Exhibit 26, the $295.80 
for a gas tank. 
2. Under Paragraph 9, $804.00 for Kellogg, Idaho. 
3. Under Paragraph 14, $8,149.00 for new 
transmission (plaintiffs already were paying rent 
which should have covered repairs). 
Item 4 & 5. There is simply insufficient evidence 
either way for the court to rule with respect 
thereto. 
Items 6 & 7. The evidence was sufficient to 
convince this court that these charges were not 
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related to the project in the sums of $2,288.00 and 
$1,892.00. 
Item 8. There is sufficient confusion, lack of 
records, and insufficient substantiation by both sides 
to render the Court unable to determine the validity of 
this claim and the Court therefore makes no order 
thereon. It is recognized sums were wired on 
September 22, 1981, just days, according to Marston, 
before the project was completed. Just how the money 
was used, whether it was justified, or otherwise is 
unclear. The testimony thereon was not detailed from 
either side but was disputed. The Inter-office 
Memorandum attached to Exhibit no. 26 and dated 
February 20th, 1983 is the clearest statement we have, 
but the Court is left with insufficient evidence to 
find for the Plaintiff thereon. In that regard, it 
does not appear that the cost of the project greatly 
exceeded the cost anticipated by the parties before its 
commencement. 
The Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the sum of 
$13,428.80. The issue of attorney fees was reserved and the 
Court will entertain requests thereon. 
Dated this AI day of August, 1988. 
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Memorandum Decision 
(on attorney fees) 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS & MINING CORP, 
Plaintiff 
VS 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC. 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 830018093 
On the 31st day of August 1988, this Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision reserving the issue as to attorneys fees. 
The issue arises under paragraph 7(c) of the Vipont Confirmation 
Project Agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2) as follows: 
"In the event that legal action shall be 
necessary to enforce the provisions hereof, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorneys fees'. 
This action arose originally by plaintiff seeking the return 
of equipment owned by it, but held by the Defendant. The 
Defendant brought a counter claim to enforce certain provisions of 
the agreement, most specifically paragraph 5c. In response the 
Plaintiff answered and moved to amend its complaint and alleged 
therein a claim for recision and other damages. Judge Call made 
findings and issued an Order on May 20, 1986, on issues with 
respect to paragraph 5 (c). 
The Defendant had brought legal action to "enforce the 
provisions" of the Agreement, but therein was clearly not the 
prevailing party. 
With respect to the Plaintiffs claim for the return of the 
equipment, though not specifically provided for in the agreement, 
except as referred to under paragraph 4(3), the Plaintiff was the 
prevailing party, as it was also with respect to the issue of the 
ultimate responsibility for certain costs and expenses of the 
operation of the project in the sum of $13,428.00 
As to the claim of recision also brought by the Plaintiff, 
the Plaintiff was not the prevailing party. ^ , 
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The major issues consuming the majority of attorneys fees 
were: 
1. The $500,000 line of credit under paragraph 5. 
2.. The Recision of the agreement and return of all funds 
expended by the Plaintiff. 
3. The return of equipment. 
The other issues, though not insubstantial were overshadowed in 
the effort expended on those issues above stated. The foregoing 
is fairly confirmed by a review of the Affidavits filed by the 
respective counsel as to billings. 
The issues appear as follows: 
1. With respect to the 5 (c) line of credit issue upon which 
the Defendant did not prevail and Under the language of paragraph 
7 (d) then, is the Plaintiff entitled to fees expended in 
resisting Defendants efforts? 
2. With respect to the issue of recision, since the Plaintiff 
was not able to prevail thereon, and which was not actually an 
effort to " enforce the provisions" of the contract, is the 
Defendant entitled to fees expended in resisting Plaintiff's 
efforts? 
3. Although Plaintiff was successfull in obtaining the return 
of its equipment and award of some funds, were those through 
"enforcement of the provisions" of the Agreement? 
The questions of "enforcement", "prevailing party", and 
reciprocity, are at the heart of each of the 3 above stated 
problems. 
The Agreement was executed the 28th day of May 1981, thereby 
making section 78-27-57 Utah Code Anotated inapplicable. The 
Supreme Court in the case of Travner vs Cusiks P2d, 856 (1984) was 
helpful in that it appears therein that this Court should consider 
fees expended in successfully "enforcing the provisions" of the 
Contract, and those for defending such claims if there is language 
with respect to the "prevailing party", as there is here. The 
language of the agreement further colors the problem as its speaks 
of not only "enforcement" and "prevailing party", but further is 
affected by the phrase "shall be necessary to enforce." 
Using the direction of Travner Supra, and the reading of the 
exact language of the Agreement, the Court finds as follows: 
1. The Replevin action and fees expended therein was not 
"necessary to enforce the provisions", but was brought only to 
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obtain the return of property owned by the Plaintiff. The action 
arose from the relationship of the parties, but was not from the 
"provisions" of the Agreement. Only Paragraph 4(b)(3) addresses 
the equipment and then only part of it. It speaks of nothing with 
respect to the return thereof, the continued ownership thereof, 
storage fees, etc. 
2. The litigation relative to the $500,000 line of credit 
under paragraph 5 (c), was an effort by the Defendant to " enforce 
the provisions", but upon which it failed. Under Travner, fees 
are awardable to the Plaintiff for the defense of Defendant's 
claims since the Plaintiff was the "prevailing party". 
As to the sums to be awarded thereon, counsel for the 
Plaintiff stated at the hearing that approximately 75% of 
Plaintiff's time and effort was expended in defending said claims 
by the Defendant under 5(c) of the Agreement. Since the Answer 
and Counterclaim were filed the 9th of September 1983, all fees 
expended prior thereto could not reasonably relate to that 
defense. From September of 1983 until March of 1985 when the 
Amended Complaint was filed, most of the efforts appear to be 
geared to the defense of the Counterclaim, but could also be in 
large part for preparation and filing of the Amended Complaint and 
claim for recision. 
There is little question that efforts regarding Summary 
Judgment motions filed by both parties from February 1985 thru 
August 1986 were for the most part directed at the defending 
against Defendant's claim. Thereafter, though, some efforts were 
expended in beating back the Defendant's renewed efforts at 
attacking Judge Call's Order, most of the time expended was in 
trial preparation. 
Between the dates, however, of February 1985 when Defendant 
filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and August of 1986 
when the final hearing thereon was held, the Plaintiff appears to 
have expended almost 500 hours of attorney's time possibly in 
defense of said Counterclaim and Motion. The Court cannot 
determine the exact number of hours spent exclusively thereon, but 
it would be safe to find that at least one-half thereof apply 
There was no real contest between the parties relative to the 
reasonableness of the hourly fees. For the several attorneys 
working for the plaintiff on the case, those fees ranged from 
$35.00 per hour to $120 per hour. Roughly half of those were at 
$120.00 per hour, approximately, one-third at $80 per hour, and 
the balance at $40 per hour. It is noted that of the 1,507.30 
total hours expended by Mr. Martineau's firm, about one-third are 
critical to the time in question.The Court finds that the 
attorney's fees payable for the efforts of Mr. Martineau's firm 
are in the sum of $24,100. It is noted that of the 1,507.30 total 
hours expended by Mr. Martineau's firm, about one-third are 
critical to the time in question. The Court finds that 
1559 
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approximately one-half of that costs are for defense of 
defendant's Counterclaim. Total assesable costs are $1830.00. 
The fees expended with L. Robert Anderson appear to be in 
part related to defense of defendant's Counterclaim, and the Court 
therefore awards one-half thereof in the sum of $3,725. As to Mr. 
Church, some hours were spent in direct connection with the 
defense of defendant's counterclaim and the Court awards thereon 
the sum of $1,000. 
Total awarded to Plaintiff of attorney's fees is $28,825.00 
plus $1,830.00 costs. 
3 With respect to the plaintiff's claim for recision and 
upon which it was unsuccessful, the Court does not find that such 
was an effort to "enforce the provisions" of the Agreement. The 
defendant then, though the prevailing party on that issue, is not 
awarded fees thereon. 
4. With respect to the successful claims of plaintiff which 
were essentially for reimbursement, those were not brought for 
enforcement of the "provisions", but in fact were outside the 
terms and provisions of the contract. No fees are awarded thereon. 
In thai:regard, Exhibit Number 19 apears to possibly add 
provisions to the agreement, at least as far as the plaintiff 
perceived its responsibilities or the effectuation of its 
responsibilities. Exhibit Number 21 further confirms the same and 
notes an expansion of the to be work performed and perhaps 
evidences an amendment to the Agreement. Testimony at trial from 
Miller and Marsten further somewhat supported that position. In 
any event, it does not appear to this Court that they would rise 
to the level that they would affect the outcome of this matter 
with respect to the aplication of attorney's fees. No award of 
attorney's fees is made, except as to plaintiff's defense of the 
claim relative to the enforcement of paragraph 5(c) of the 
agreement as above stated in the sum of $29,853. 
Dated this 29th day of March 1989. 
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Conclusions of Law 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
THOMAS H. CHURCH 
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW 
1354 Albion Avenue 
P.O. Box 1286 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Telephone: (208) 678-0988 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 830018093 CN 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial 
before the Court sitting without a jury on June 8, 1988 for an 
adjudication of the five remaining issues identified in Section 
V of Plaintiff's Trial Brief as not having been theretofore 
resolved by the prior rulings of the Court and the stipulation 
of the parties, the plaintiff appearing by and through its 
counsel Ray G. Martineau and Thomas H. Church and the dfe|QBlbg&a£ 
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appearing by and through its president Thomas F. Miller and its 
counsel Lloyd J. Webb and Roger F. Baron, and the Court having 
heard and considered the evidence offered and presented on 
behalf of each of the parties during the course of the trial 
which continued through June 10, 1988, and the Court having 
subsequently heard and considered the statements and arguments 
of counsel presented at the hearing before the Court on August 
11, 1988 and the Court having thereafter issued its Memorandum 
Decision herein dated August 31, 1988 and the Court having 
reviewed and considered the Affidavits and Verified Memorandum 
concerning cost and attorneyTs fees submitted on behalf of the 
parties, and the Court having heard and considered the state-
ments and arguments of counsel presented at the hearing before 
the Court on February 22, 1989, and the Court having thereafter 
issued its Memorandum Decision herein dated March 29, 1989, and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor now makes and enters the following: 
FINDING OF FACTS 
1. The following facts heretofore found and adjudi-
cated by the Court to exist as a matter of law and without 
substantial controversy by its Order Determining Uncontroverted 
Facts And Conclusions Of Law dated May 20, 1986 ("Courts May 
20, 1986 Order") are now the "law of the case" in this pro-
ceeding, are hereby reaffirmed and are by this reference incor-
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porated herein and made a part hereof: 
(a) The parties contemplated at the time the 
Confirmation Agreement was entered into that defendant 
would, within the time provided therein, tender to 
plaintiff marketable title to the Vipont mining pro-
perties ("Properties") free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances and reasonable certainty of freedom from 
the hazards of litigation. 
(b) Defendant breached its obligations to tender 
marketable title to the Properties to plaintiff. 
(c) The title insurance commitment that was pro-
vided by defendant to plaintiff in late 1982 was not 
the equivalent of marketable title. 
2. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon defendant's 
undertaking under the Confirmation Agreement to tender marke-
table title to the Properties. 
3. Following the execution of the Confirmation 
Agreement the parties, under the direction of Marston & Marston 
as the prime contractor and defendant as a subcontractor 
working on a "cost only basis", entered into the performance of 
the Confirmation Project on a fast track basis and completed 
the same on or about September 26, 1981. 
4. Plaintiff did not, prior to on or about October 
15, 1981, learn of the full nature and extent of Paul Hoffman's 
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claims that (a) he had invested over $400,000.00 in the 
Properties, (b) that he was the owner of a 25% interest 
therein, (c) that he held an option to acquire an additional 
25% interest therein, (d) that he was entitled to 80% of the 
net operating revenues therefrom until all sums he had advanced 
had been repaid in full, and (e) that he fully intended to pur-
sue his claims in connection with the litigation he had there-
tofore initiated and that then remained pending undetermined 
against defendant in the State of Idaho. 
5. The extension by the parties from time to time of 
the deadline for plaintiff to exercise its option under the 
Confirmation Agreement to enter into the Joint Venture was for 
the purpose of enabling defendant to resolve its title problems 
and thereby enable it to tender marketable title to the 
Properties. 
6. Plaintiff was at all times during the period com-
mencing October 14, 1981 and ending February 3, 1983 ready, 
willing and able to exercise its option to enter into the Joint 
Venture and fulfill all of its obligations in connection 
therewith and the only reason plaintiff did not do so was 
defendants failure to tender marketable title, as reflected by 
the following facts: 
(a) Plaintiff wire transferred $1,600,000.00 to 
a bank in Twin Falls, Idaho prior to October 14, 1981, 
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and plaintiff's officers were present in Twin Falls, 
Idaho on October 14 and 15, 1981 fully prepared to 
enter into the Joint Venture Agreement on behalf of 
plaintiff. 
(b) Plaintiff expended the sum of $595,482.55 in 
connection with the Confirmation Agreement, 
$100,000.00 of which was wire transferred to defendant 
on September 22, 1981, just four days prior to the 
completion of the Confirmation Project, to "be uti-
lized through October 16, 1981 to further rehabilitate 
the A-Level" workings on the Properties. 
(c) In mid-1982 plaintiff (i) provided defendant 
with a copy of the Marston & Marston Report, although 
plaintiff had no legal obligation to do so, and (ii) 
arranged for one of its affiliates to make a personal 
loan to defendant's president, Tom Miller, and his 
wife in the amount of $45,000.00. 
(d) Plaintiff left its equipment ("Equipment"), 
for which it paid over $100,000.00, in defendant's 
care at the Properties so that the same would be 
readily available for use by the Joint Venture, there 
being no other reason for plaintiff leaving its 
Equipment in defendant's care. 
(e) Bill Fillman, plaintiff's them president, 
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with the aid of the Marston & Marston Report, expended 
substantial time and effort throughout 1982 nego-
tiating with various financial institutions in Canada 
and the United States to determine what institutional 
financing might be available to the Joint Venture, 
(f) Plaintiff never waived, released or other-
wise relinquished its option to enter into the Joint 
Venture, nor did it ever release defendant from its 
obligation to tender marketable title. 
(g) Subsequent to February 3, 1983 Steven 
Friedrich, the person who was most directly involved 
in the negotiations and dealings with defendant on 
plaintiff's behalf, sought the release by plaintiff of 
its interest in the Properties so that he could go 
forward in concert with defendant in the development 
and operation of the Properties, 
(h) Defendant's failure to tender marketable 
title was the sole cause of plaintiff not exercising 
its option, 
7. Of the $284,474.00 that was paid to defendant 
under the Confirmation Agreement, $13,428.80 was either 
unjustified on a "cost only basis" or plaintiff failed to pro-
perly substantiate the same on the basis of appropriate and 
necessary documentation. These unjustified billings included 
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the charging of: 
(a) The sum of $295.80 for a gas tank that was 
retained by defendant, 
(b) The sum of $804.00 for a trip to Kellogg, 
Idaho that unrelated to the Confirmation Project. 
(c) The sum of $8,149.00 for a new transmission 
where plaintiff was already paying rent which covered 
such repairs. 
(d) The sum of $2,288.00 for excess indirect 
overhead charges. 
(e) The sum of $1,892.00 for hours billed for 
personnel not working on the Confirmation Project. 
8. There was never any agreement between the parties 
that plaintiff would be billed or would pay any storage charges 
for defendant to store plaintifffs Equipment. It was simply 
agreed between them that plaintiff's Equipment would remain in 
the care of defendant for the mutual benefit of the parties, 
pending the anticipated prompt resolution of defendant's title 
problems so that the Joint Venture could go forward and the 
Equipment could be utilized in connection therewith. 
9. It was only because of plaintiff's belief that 
the existing title problems would be promptly resolved, coupled 
with plaintiff's substantial investment and compelling interest 
in going forward with the Joint Venture, that plaintiff's 
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Equipment was left in the defendant's care, 
10. During the period that plaintiff's Equipment was 
in defendant's care, defendant exercised at least the degree of 
care for such Equipment that it did for its own, 
11. At no time prior to late April or early May of 
1983 did defendant (a) advise plaintiff that defendant would 
assert any claim for the storage of plaintiff's Equipment, (b) 
advise plaintiff of the amount defendant intended to claim for 
storage charges, (c) provide plaintiff with the alternative 
choice of making other arrangements for the storage of plain-
tiff's Equipment, (d) make any independent inquiry in the local 
area as the availability of alternative storage facilities at 
competitive prices, (e) obtain any legal opinion with regard 
to defendant's potential liability for any damage to or loss of 
plaintiff's Equipment, or (f) make any effort to determine the 
availability and cost of insurance coverage for plaintiff's 
Equipment. 
12. There was no valid basis for defendant's claim of 
a right to a lien upon plaintiff's Equipment or for storage 
charges for the storage by defendant of the same and as a con-
sequence plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant plain-
tiff's costs in the amount of $3,600.00 relating to the posting 
of the bond as required by the Court herein in order for plain-
tiff to recover possession of its Equipment. 
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13. Plaintiff has been required to employ the attor-
ney's appearing herein on its behalf to enforce the provisions 
of the Confirmation Agreement and has agreed to pay said attor-
neys a reasonable attorney's fee for their services herein. 
Plaintiff has incurred reasonable and necessary attorney's fees 
in the amount of $28,825.00 and reasonable and necessary costs 
in the amount of $1,830.00 in connection with plaintiff's 
efforts to enforce the provisions of the Confirmation 
Agreement. 
From the foregoing Finding of Fact the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The Court's May 20, 1986 Order, including the 
Conclusions of Law set forth therein which are now the law of 
this case, are hereby reaffirmed and by this reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
2. The Court's Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment And Order On Motions Fro Partial Summary Judgment 
herein dated May 20, 1986 in hereby reaffirmed and by this 
reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a judgment 
and decree herein in its favor and against defendant for the 
sum of $13^28.00 representing sums of plaintiff was billed and 
paid .that were not justified on a "cost only basis" as provided 
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by the Confirmation Agreement, together with interest thereon 
at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from and after 
October 15, 1981 until judgment, for the sum of $28,825.00 
representing attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily 
incurred by plaintiff in enforcing the provisions of the 
Confirmation Agreement, for the sum of $3,600,00 representing 
the costs incurred by plaintiff in connection with the posting 
of the bond herein in connection with the recovery of plain-
tiff's Equipment, and for the sum of $1,830.00 representing the 
costs plaintiff reasonably and necessarily incurred in 
enforcing the provisions of the Confirmation Agreement. 
MADE AND ENTERED this J^j day of ^JIJJVU , 
1989. 
Gordon "J.~ Low 
"TTi s t r i c t Cour t / Judge 
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Certificate of Service 
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Finding Of 
Fact And Conclusion Of Law to the following individuals on this 
«Dt day of April, 1989. 
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq. 
Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine 
155 2nd Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
Roger F. Baron, Esq. 
Bunderson & Baron 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
\£r>?*-siyx. 
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Judgment 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
1800 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2400 
THOMAS H. CHURCH 
CHURCH, CHURCH & SNOW 
1354 Albion Avenue 
P.O. Box 1286 
Burley, Idaho 83318 
Telephone: (208) 678-0988 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORE METALS AND MINING 
CORPORATION, a c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 830018093 CN 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial 
before the Court sitting without a jury on June 8, 1988 for an 
adjudication of the five remaining issues identified in Section 
V of Plaintiff's Trial Brief as not having been theretofore 
resolved by the prior rulings of the Court and the stipulation 
of the parties, the plaintiff appearing by and through its 
counsel Ray G. Martineau and Thomas H. Church and the defendant 
Number , • • ., 
"
1
" JUN 19.1989 
M I C R O F I L M E D M I C R O F I L M E D j.P^A/W/ )A/sJ~y 
appearing by and through its president Thomas F. Miller and its 
counsel Lloyd J. Webb and Roger F. Baron, and the Court having 
heard and considered the evidence offered and presented on 
behalf of each of the parties during the course of the trial 
which continued through June 10, 1988, and the Court having 
subsequently heard and considered the statements and arguments 
of counsel presented at the hearing before the Court on August 
11, 1988 and the Court having thereafter issued its Memorandum 
Decision herein dated August 31, 1988 and the Court having 
reviewed and considered the Affidavits and Verified Memorandum 
concerning cost and attorney's fees submitted on behalf of the 
parties, and the Court having heard and considered the state-
ments and arguments of counsel presented at the hearing before 
the Court on February 22, 1989, and the Court having thereafter 
issued its Memorandum Decision herein dated March 29, 1989, and 
the Court having heretofore made and entered its Finding of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law herein and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor 
hereby enters Judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plain-
tiff be and it is hereby awarded judgment against defendant for 
the sum of $13,^28.00, together with interest thereon at the 
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from and after October 15, 
1981 to and including the date hereof, which interest is in the 
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sum of $ as of the date hereof, for the sum of 
$5,430.00 costs, and for the sura of $28,825.00 attorneyfs fees 
as of the date hereof, subject to such additional award of 
attorney's fees as may be just and equitable in the premises in 
the event of any appeal or further proceedings herein, 
MADE AND ENTERED this I °[ day of ^jliTUJ , 
1989-
Gp^ tfon J. /Low 
District CourtXjudge 
Certificate of Service 
This will certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing form of 
Judgment to the following individuals on this ^>C day of 
April, 1989. 
Lloyd J. Webb, Esq. 
Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine 
155 2nd Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 1768 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1768 
Roger F. Baron, Esq, 
Bunderson & Baron 
45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
APPENDIX "H" 
mmmmm*mim&mmm&f*m^immtf$ 
VIPONT CONFIRMATION PROJECT AGREEMENT 
IT IS AGREED this go day of May, 1981, by and between the parties 
here specified according to the terms hereof: 
*• Parties: The parties to this agreement are : 
United Silver Mines, Inc., a Utah corporation, Box 267, Oakley, Idaho 
83346, hereinafter called "United", and 
Dore Metals and Mining Corporation, a Nevada corporation, Box 11850, 
Saint Louis, Missouri, 63105, hereinafter called "Dore". 
2* Purpose: The purpose of this agreement is: 
(a) To give Dore the exclusive right to prove ore reserves located upon 
properties owned by United Silver Mines, Inc. It is the desire of Dore to confirm reserves 
containing at least one million ounces of recoverable silver. 
(b) To prove reserves of at least 100,000 ounces of silver in the A-level 
and Phelan dumps to qualify those dumps as collateral for a $500,000 line of credit from 
Dore to United for work on the Miller X-cut. 
(c) To grant unto Dore certain option rights herein specified. 
3. United Agrees: In consideration of the mutual covenants here 
contained, United agrees: 
(a) To grant to Dore the exclusive rights for the five-month period from 
May 15, 1981 through October 15, 1981, to perform a confirmation project on its Vipont 
claims (53 patented lode mining claims) located in the Ashbrook Mining -District, Box 
Elder County, Utah. 
(b) To grant to Dore the exclusive option to enter into a joint venture 
agreement with United, provided that the option to enter into tha t agreement shall be 
exercised on or before October 15, 1981, according to the terms of the joint venture 
agreement this day approved by the parties to this agreement, and according to no other 
terms (copy attached). 
(c) To rehabil i ta te , including the employment of manual labor, timber, 
explosives, permits and other facilities necessary to that rehabilitation, the A-level 
cross-cut and to generally make the workings thereof safe for consultants employed by 
Dore to sample and evaluate materials , at the expense of Dore on a cost only basis. 
(d) To make available all mine maps or records as required by the 
consultants for their evaluation and assist them as required. 
4. Pore Agrees: In consideration of the mutual covenants here 
contained, Dore agrees: 
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(a) To pay to United $43,000.00 as a non-refundable payment to be used 
to purchase timber for the A-level rehabilitation and for the Miller cross-cut. 
(b) To undertake a confirmation project as to United ls properties 
situated as here specified, including the following specific act ivi t ies : 
(1) To reopen the A-level cross-cut a t Dore*s expense utilizing the 
efforts and material of United as specified above and to thoroughly sample 
the old mine workings as necessary in the opinion of Dore!s consultant to 
confirm ore reserves suggested by old mine maps and records. 
(2) To surface-drill several holes between the previously drilled 
V-holes and the old workings, i.e. Phelan level, and other holes as required. 
(3) To trench and sample from the surface as required. 
(4) To surface sample and map. 
(5) To retain the services of Marston and Marston or equivalent 
consultants to perform the project. 
(6) To sample and measure the A-level and Phelan dumps. 
(7) To do other necessary work as deemed necessary by Dore. 
As to the confirmation project: 
(1) It is understood and agreed that the expense thereof shall be 
exclusively Dore*s; 
(2) It is agreed by United and Dore that the core-drilling will be 
done by a competent core driller, such as Boyles Brothers, Longyear, e t c . 
with approval by United and Dore; 
(3) It is agreed Dore will furnish United with an appropriate Load 
Haul Dump (LHD) machine for this work, a generator of appropriate size, 
and a mine fan for ventilation; 
(4) It is agreed that the confirmation project shall in no way 
interfere with United*s heap leach process, which will be going on 
simultaneously on the property. The old tailings shall remain the sole 
ownership of United. The old mine dumps on the property shall remain the 
sole ownership of United until and unless the option for joint venture is 
exercised. 
5. If the Option for Joint Venture is not Exercised: In the event that 
Dore does not exercise the option to enter into the joint venture according to the terms 
of agreement thereof, on or before October 15, 1981: 
(a) Dore forefeits all rights arising by this or any other agreement with 
United. 
(b) All results of sampling, including assays, drill-core maps, etc. , 
become the sole possession of United. 
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(c) Dore must grant United a $500,000 line of credit for five (5) years 
secured by the A-level and Phelan dumps if the sampling and measurement activity on 
those dumps confirms at least 100,000 ounces of silver. Said confirmation activity must 
be completed within four (4) weeks of the date of this agreement and the line of credit 
established upon presentation to Dore of t i t le to said dumps as collateral and the 
consultants report confirming 100,000 ounces of silver. 
Repayment of the principal balance borrowed against said line of 
credit shall begin a t the end of the thirty-sixth (36) month of the loan agreement and 
shall be at the ra te of $20,833 per month. Interest on outstanding balances will be 
payable monthly and will be computed daily at the greater of 16% per annum or the most 
recent rate paid by the U. S. Treasury for 26-week Treasury Bills. 
6. If the Option is Exercised: In the event tha t the option to enter 
into the joint venture agreement according to its terms is exercised on or before October 
15, 1981, Dore shall be permitted to transfer the costs incurred in the confirmation 
project to the joint venture for reimbursement as an expense of the joint venture, 
provided that Dore is not permitted to transfer more than $300,000.00 to the joint 
venture in that regard. United shall be permitted to transfer any outstanding balance on 
its line of credit per \f2(b) to the joint venture line of credit to be extended by Dore as 
part of the venture agreement. 
7. General Terms of Agreement: The following general terms of 
agreement shall apply: 
(a) Dore!s rights under this agreement are wholly non-assignable, and in 
the event of any at tempted assignment, i ts rights shall lapse and whatever investment it 
shall have made shall be forfeited to United. 
(b) Dore agrees to assume liability for and to hold United harmless by 
reason of its activities, either individually or through contractors and subcontractors, in 
connection with the confirmation project and agrees to carry necessary liability 
insurance, at its own premium expense, in a reputable casualty insurance company for 
that purpose. 
(c) United agrees to provide workmen's compensation insurance for its 
employees. 
(d) In the event that legal action shall be necessary to enforce the 
provisions hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney fee. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC. 
By ^ jitn^^i J?! h^/As7 . 
- 'Thomas F. Milier ' 
President 
DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION 
By £Z*^^(2z£ _ 
E u g ^ e M. Goldtnan 
President 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Cassia 
ss. 
On this <TQ_ day of May, 1981, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for said State and County, personally appeared THOMAS F. MILLER, President of 
UNITED SILVER MIN£s, INC., the corporation whose name is subscribed to the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation e x e r t e d the same. 
/>• / / 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have herexfittf/iei ffiy/fi^{find affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this certificate first 
NOTARY PUBLIC^FDR IDAHO , ^ y . . . 
R e s i d e n c e / \/"7p,W F&/fe, 3d&x& > ' 
« / / 
STATE OF MISSOURI 
County of St. Louis 
) 
) ss. 
) 
On this g&?„^ day of May, 1981. before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for said State and County, personally appeared EUGENE M. GOLDMAN, President of 
DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION, the corporation whose name is subscribed 
to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the 
same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this cert if icate first above writ ten. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR MISSOURI 
Residence; r £ y < AJ/n^+r I* /> 6, f/cr,js««t. #?• 
Commission expires: ~ ^ ^ ^ , 9 , ^ 
0 T 
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•VIPONT JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
This Joint Venture agreement entered into and effective this day 
of , 1981, by and between: 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., a Utah corporation, P. 0 . Box 267, Oakley, 
Idaho 83346, hereinafter called "United", and 
DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, P. 0 . 
Box 11850*, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, hereinafter called "Dore". 
1. Purpose of Joint Venture: 
The'purpose of the Joint Venture is to combine property, skill, knowledge, and 
financial resources to explore for, develop, and mine silver, gold, and other ores from a 
property presently owned by Bannock Silver Mining Co., a Utah corporation, herein 
designated as "Bannock", located in the Ashbrook Mining District, Box Elder County, 
Utah, known as the Vipont Silver Mine, and other properties located within two (2) miles 
of the present boundaries of the Vipont Silver Mine. 
2. .Ownership: 
Vipont shall be a Joint Venture of the part ies with 50% interest therein in 
each party, provided, however, tha t the mining properties now owned by Bannock shall 
remain in United!s ownership until such time as the $6 million credit contemplated herein 
shall have been fully advanced to Vipont. At that t ime, Dore shall be deeded a one-half 
fee simple ^interest in those properties, and pending that t ime, a deed for that purpose 
shall be placed and held in escrow with Zion's First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
herein designated as "Zion!s", conveying that interest from United to Dore. 
If, for any reason, the contemplated credit is not advanced, the properties 
will remain in the ownership of United and, upon its demand, the deed of part ial interest 
therein shall be returned to United by the escrow agent . 
3. Name of Joint Venture and Principal Office: 
(a) The name of the Joint Venture shall be Vipont. 
(b) The principal office of the Joint Venture shall be at 207 South Wilson, 
P. O. Box 267, Oakley, Idaho 83346. The Joint Venture shall conduct business at such 
location and in any additional locations as may, from time to t ime, be determined. 
4. Term of Joint Venture: 
The Joint Venture shall continue from the date hereof until cancelled either 
upon breach hereof or upon mutual consent of the part ies . 
No venturers shall have the right to voluntarily withdraw from the Joint 
Venture, 
5. Management; 
The Joint Venture shall be managed as follows: 
(a) The Joint Venture shall have four directors . The Chairman and 
President of United will serve as the Managing Director and the Chairman and President 
of LLC Corporation, the President of Dore, and a Vice-President or the Secretary-
Treasurer of United will act as the other directors. 
(b) United and Dore agree to consult together concerning the exploration, 
development and mining work to be done pursuant to this agreement, but the final 
decision concerning the work to be done and the manner of performance shall be made by 
United provided that such work is accomplished a t a cost not to exceed 115% of the 
estimated costs specified in VI2 hereof and the various tasks are completed within sixty 
(60) days of a Master Project Schedule, a t tached to this agreement as "Schedule A" and 
by this reference made a part hereof, to be developed by United with assistance, as 
required, from Dore. Should unforeseen delays not due to weather or other Acts of God 
in excess of sixty (60) days or cost overruns in excess of 115% of the est imate occur, 
Dore may request United to retain the services of a recognized consulting firm whose 
recommendations as to completion of work, if acceptable to Dore shall be binding on 
United. 
(c) The Managing Director shall have full authority to make all 
disbursements for the Joint Venture, to execute all documents, and to generally manage 
the Joint Venture business. 
(d) United will be the operator and manager of the Vipont Silver Mine and 
will be subject only to major policy determinations of Vipont. United will operate the 
mine solely on a cost-only basis. 
6. Property: 
United will make available a first deed of trust on the following mining 
claims, controlled by United and owned by Bannock, known as the "Property", to secure 
loans to the Joint Venture made by Dore*s lender, Oklahoma Morris Plan, herein 
designated as "Morris", consistent with V10 hereof. The property is described herein as 
follows: 
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Fifty three (53) patented lode mining claims in Section 31, T. 15 N., R. 17 W.; 
Sections 6 and 7, T. 14 N., K. 17 W.; Section 36, T. 15 N., R. 18 W.; and 
Sections 1 and 12, T. 14 N., R. 18 W. - Salt Lake Meridian, Ashbrook Mining 
District, Box Elder County, Utah (the '.'Property"), consisting of 
approximately 1,000 acres and more particularly described as follows: 
Claims 
Catherine, Nos. 1-6 
Contact Mine, Nos. 1-3 
Dugway, Nos. 1-6, 8-20 
Fraction 
Northern, 1-5 
Park, Nos. 1-4 
Poorman 
Sentinel Mine No. 2 
Southern Nos. 1-3 
West End 
Argenta 
Black 
Champion 
plipper 
Homestake 
Homestake Millsite 
Lexington 
Mahogany 
Sentinel 
Contribution by United; 
Patent No. 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
42134 
24640 
24639 
24642 
24577 
24576 
24576 
24643 
24641 
24578 
United agrees to make the following contributions to the Joint Venture: 
(a) To grant unto Dore's lender, Morris, a first deed of trust on the Vipont 
Claims Group known as the "Property", described herein in detail. The deed of trust will 
be placed in escrow in Zion's First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah ("ZionV) until 
such time as the escrow requirements are fully performed by Dore and its lender. 
(b) To act as the Managing Director and Manager of the Joint Venture. 
(c) To manage and operate the Vipont Silver Mine. 
(d) To deed 50% of the Vipont claims to Dore upon satisfaction of Dore's 
promises contained herein. 
8. Contribution by Pore: 
Dore agrees to make available the following contributions to the capital of 
the Joint Venture: 
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(a) Provide a two-year irrevocable line of credit totalling $6 million during 
the first two years of this agreement, according to the Development and Mine Operation 
Plan specified in 1112 hereof and Schedule A per l!5(b) hereof. 
The above money will be loaned to the Joint Venture so long as the project is 
within 115% of the estimated amounts and so long as no part of the project is more than 
60 days behind the scheduled dates set out in Schedule A and shall bear interest and be 
repayable as per schedule under Loans, 1110 hereof. 
Should the costs needed for the accomplishment of the Plan, per 1112 hereof 
exceed 115% of the estimated amounts, Dore will provide additional loans to the extent 
needed for the accomplishment thereof pursuant to the recommendations of a consultant 
per l!5.(b), hereof. 
(bj Transfer its confirmation results to the Joint Venture at cost, but not to 
exceed $300,000.00. 
9. Vipont's Reimbursement to Joint Venture Par t ies : 
Upon the signing of this agreement, Vipont will do the following: 
(a) Acquire the confirmation results from Dore at cost, Dore to be 
reimbursed not to exceed $300,000.00 total . 
(b) Pay United for its investment to date in the Vipont Claims. This 
includes property purchase, buildings, equipment, improvements, i.e. roads, samplings, 
Miller X-cut, etc. , in the approximate amount of $700,000.00. 
(c) Assume the note from United to Dore secured by the A-level and Phelan 
dumps, the proceeds of which were used to further construct the Miller cross-cut . 
10. Loans: 
All loans made to the Joint Venture shall be secured by a first deed of trust 
("Deed") on the "Property". This deed of trust will be placed in escrow at Zion's and will 
remain there until the $6 million commitment is loaned to Vipont, or for two years, 
whichever occurs first, at which time it will be transferred to Dore!s lender, the 
Oklahoma Morris Plan ("Morris"), provided that Dore shall have then fully honored its 
loan commitments here contained, or until United shall determine that sufficient capital 
of lesser amount has been expended to maintain a viable operation. 
Morris shall have in its possession the Deed until the loans have been repaid in 
full, at which time the Deed will be relinquished to the Joint Venture. 
The above loans will be reduced start ing the end of the 9th quarter of this 
agreement. Until the loans have been repaid, all net revenues, as defined in 1112 hereof, 
shall be divided as follows: 40% to repay the Dopcyloan balance, 30% to Dore and 30% to 
United. The loans will be paid in full by the enp of five years . The loan repayment 
schedule will be automatically extended beyond the five years where Acts of God, such 
as fire, flood, strikes, war, or major government-caused economic conditions prevail, for 
\ ^ \ 
the length of time of the condition specified. If not repaid within five years, 100% of the 
net revenues shall be paid to Dore for application upon the loans until they shall be 
paid. Once the loans have been repaid, net revenues shall be divided 50% to United and 
50% to Dore. 
Loan balances outstanding will bear interest at the greater of 16% per annum, 
or the most recent rate paid by the U.S. Treasury for 26-week Treasury Bills, computed 
daily and payable monthly. 
All major equipment purchases can be made on a turnkey lease from Dore to 
Vipont. The amount of the turnkey lease, with a fixed 16% annual interest factor, will be 
deducted from the $6 million credit line from Dore. Vipont shall own the equipment at 
the end of the lease term. 
United shall have the option to pay up to 100% of its share of net revenues to 
payment of loans whenever it shall deem it appropriate and Dore shall concurrently make 
an equal payment from its share. 
11. Bank Accounts: 
Upon the execution hereof, Dore shall deposit at least $500,000.00 into a 
Vipont account at a bank to be chosen by the directors and agrees thereafter to maintain 
that account at a* balance of at least $250,000.00 by replenishing that account at least 
monthly so that adequate working capital for the venture shall be available in accordance 
with the Master Project Schedule A. 
All Joint Venture bank accounts shall be subject to draws by signatories at 
the exclusive designation of the Managing Director. 
12. Development and Mine Operation; 
The Vipont Silver Mine (Property) will be developed by United as is outlined 
under Proposed Development, page 2,2 and 24 of the T. F. Miller report dated January 15, 
1981. Estimated costs to complete development and commence production is $2,260,000 
as outlined on page 23 of said report. The lead time to commence production of ore and 
concentrate shall not exceed eighteen (18) months from date of this agreement except as 
extended on a day-for-day basis to offset delays caused by Acts of God. 
The objective is to build a selective flotation mill of 150-200 TPD capacity, 
with a silver-gold precipitation unit to further reduce the silver-gold concentrates. 
Ultimately, it is the goal of Vipont to make its own bullion. The estimated cost of this 
milling facility is $2,000,000.00. Total mine and mill development costs are estimated to 
be $4,260,000.00 including production start-up. 
After commercial mining shall have commenced, all ores produced shall 
belong to and be owned by United and Dore as their interest shall appear as provided in 
1110 hereof, first subject, however, to all costs and expenses, direct or indirect, which 
shall properly be allocated to development, mining, milling, and marketing of said ores. 
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Before the distribution of any net revenues to Dore or United, according to 
1^10 hereof, occurs, there shall first be established and thereafter maintained a working 
capital and contingency fund equivalent" to sustain three months mining and milling 
operations and to conduct s trategic exploration to prove or discard all potential ore 
sources within two miles of the present boundaries of the Vipont. Silver Mine. 
13. Additional Properties: 
All mining claims or other mineral property acquired within two miles of the 
present boundaries of the Vipont Silver Mine shall be for the benefit of both parties and 
shall be subject to the terms of this agreement so far as the interests of the parties 
hereto are concerned. 
14. Dumps: 
Existing dumps located on the property shall become the property of the Joint 
Venture upon its assumption of the note balance owed Dore by United for funds borrowed 
to further develop the Miller cross-cut. 
15. Grazing Lease: 
A surface grazing lease previously assigned to Thomas F. Miller for the 
grazing of livestock on the properties shall remain in effect . However, in no way will 
livestock grazing'be permitted to interfere with mining or exploration act ivi t ies . 
16. Fiscal Year and Accounting: 
The fiscal year of the Joint Venture shall end on December 31 and books of 
the Joint Venture shall be kept on a cash, accrual or other basis as the directors shall 
determine, and shall be kept in accordance with accounting principles employed by the 
Joint Venture for State and Federal income tax purposes. The books of the venture shall 
be audited annually by a Certified Public Accounting firm selected by the Managing 
Director and approved by the remaining director. 
17. Allocation of Deductions: 
The depletion allowance, leases, deductions and credits for State and Federal 
income tax purposes shall be allocated as follows: 50% to United and 50% to Dore. 
18. Inurement-Assignment: 
This agreement shall inure to and be binding upon the part ies hereto, their 
successors and assigns. 
Except by merger or consolidation with another corporation, neither party to 
this agreement may sell or dispose of any of its interests in this Joint Venture except to 
a party of equal integrity and financial responsibility, and then only after the other party 
shall have had the option to purchase on like terms and conditions for a period of 90 days 
after receiving written notice of the desire of the other party to sell, which notice shall 
give the name of the party offering to buy and the terms and conditions of the proposed 
sale. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF/ the parties have hereunto authorized its duly 
appointed officers to set its hand hereto the day and year first above writ ten. 
UNITED SILVER MINES, INC. 
By . 
Thomas F. Miller 
President 
DORE'METALS AND MINING CORPORATION 
By 
Eugene M, Goldman 
President 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Twin Palls ) 
On this day of , 1981, before me, the undersigned, a 
Notary Public in and for said State and County, personally appeared THOMAS F. 
MILLER, President of UNITED SILVER MINES, INC., the corporation whose name is 
subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation 
executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this cer t i f icate first above writ ten. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residence: 
STATE OF MISSOURI ) 
) ss. 
County of St. Louis ) 
On this day of
 f 1981, before me, the undersigned, 
a Notary Public in and for said State and County, personally appeared EUGENE M. 
GOLDMAN, President of DORE METALS AND MINING CORPORATION, the corporation 
whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that such 
corporation executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal, the day and year in this cert i f icate first above writ ten. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR MISSOURI 
Residence: 
Commission expires: 
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Hoffman v. United Silver Mines, Inc., 
116 Idaho 240, 775 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1989) 
the record of this case, we are satisfied 
that the defendant's fear was genuine. 
This is not to say that in all cases the 
defendant cannot be required to provide 
the prosecution with information as a 
condition of probation. See United 
States v. Worcester, 190 F.Supp. 548 
(D.C.Mass.1961). But such conditions 
should not attach when compliance would 
subject the defendant to a serous risk of 
harm. If there are reasonable means of 
eliminating such a risk, such as conduct-
ing the sentencing proceedings behind 
closed doors with the record sealed, then 
such conditions might be proper. How-
ever, in the instant case the damage 
has been done. The court's offer was a 
matter of public record and there are 
no steps which can now be taken to 
undo the harm. 
State v. Langford, 12 Wash.App. 228, 529 
P.2d 839, 840 (1974). 
Ill 
If I correctly read that which Justice 
Bakes has written, he would affirm and 
test the waters, whereas I would not. The 
onerous condition of probation at issue 
here should be stricken by the trial court. 
I would feel in more comfortable surround-
ings if my colleagues were of the same 
mind. It is not even a close case as to 
what our course of action should be. The 
trial court set the stage so we could decide 
the matter once and for all, but, no, not to 
be, not at this time—which seems to be-
coming a habit. I believe that the trial court 
was entirely correct in placing the ball in this 
court, and have little doubt that with a little 
leadership from this Court Mr. Badgley's life 
will not be offered up as was that of Denise 
Williams. 
IV 
All that has to be kept in mind here is 
that probation is granted as a rehabilitative 
measure. It is not a tool to be used to 
coerce offenders into gathering evidence as 
an arm of the prosecution even where the 
defendant's life is not endangered—much 
less so where, as here, the danger is real 
and palpable as testified to by the tragic 
and unnecessary death of Denise Williams. 
JOHNSON, Justice, concurring 
specially. 
I concur with Chief Justice Bakes that 
the appeal should not be dismissed. I con-
cur with the majority that the imposition of 
the condition of probation is not per se 
erroneous and that the case be remanded 
to the trial court for a determination 
whether Badgley's refusal to accept the 
condition of probation is reasonable under 
all the facts and circumstances. 
116 Idaho 240 
Paul HOFFMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
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Limited partner brought action against 
general partner of limited partnership seek-
ing compelled accounting, grant of access 
to partnership's books, damages for denial 
of access to those books, and declaration he 
had fully performed his phase I obligation, 
entitling him to 25% interest in partnership. 
Genera\ partner counterdaimea, aYieging 
limited partner had breached obligation to 
furnish $750,000 funds, seeking damages 
for alleged breach and declaration that lim-
ited partner was entitled to nothing from 
partnership. The District Court, Fifth Ju-
dicial District, Cassia County, George Gra-
nata, Jr., J., entered judgment upon jury 
verdict declaring limited partner to be own-
er of 25% interest in partnership and 
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awarding him other relief, and general 
partner appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Burnett, J., held that: (1) partnership 
agreement was ambiguous as to whether 
limited partner was required to furnish full 
$750,000 or only $400,000 of that amount to 
fulfill his obligation in phase I, with re-
mainder of funds to be derived from opera-
tion for leaching of silver from tailings and 
dumps, and evidence supported determina-
tion that intent was to impose upon limited 
partner obligation to furnish only $400,000 
during phase I, and (2) partnership agree-
ment could not be construed as entitling 
limited partner to 25% interest in partner-
ship before total investment, including any 
net profits from leaching operation, to-
talled $750,000. 
Affirmed in part; vacated in part; and 
remanded. 
1. Contracts e=>176(2) 
Whether agreement is ambiguous is 
question of law. 
2. Contracts <®=>176(1) 
If contract is not ambiguous, its inter-
pretation is question of law to be deter-
mined by trial judge rather than by jury. 
3. Contracts <3=>176(2) 
If contract is ambiguous, its meaning 
turns on underlying intent of parties, and 
intent is question of fact to be determined 
by jury in light of language of entire agree 
ment, parties' conduct, course of prior ne-
gotiations, and other extrinsic information. 
4. Appeal and Error <3=>842(8) 
District judge's determination that lim-
ited partnership agreement was ambiguous 
with respect to whether limited partner 
was required to furnish $750,000 or only 
$400,000 of that amount to fulfill obligation 
was subject to free review on appeal. 
5. Contracts ^143(2) 
Contract is ambiguous, as matter of 
law, if it is reasonably subject to conflict-
ing interpretations. 
6. Mines and Minerals <3=>99(2) 
Limited partnership agreement was 
ambiguous with respect to whether limited 
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partner was required to furnish full $750,-
000 to fulfill his phase I obligation or only 
to furnish $400,000, with the remainder of 
the $750,000 to be furnished for phase I to 
be derived from revenues from leaching of 
silver from tailings and dumps above 
ground. 
7. Mines and Minerals @=>99(2) 
Evidence supported determination that 
parties intended limited partnership agree 
ment to impose upon limited partner obli-
gation only to furnish $400,000 during 
phase I, with remaining $350,000 for phase 
1 to come from operation leaching silver 
from tailings and dumps above ground. 
8. Trial <3=>352.5(1) 
Compound interrogatories to jury are 
discouraged. 
9. Trial <s=>352.,5(4) 
Compound interrogatory to jury was 
properly focused to inquire into intent of 
parties to limited partnership agreement 
regarding limited partner's capital contri-
bution requirement for phase I. 
10. Mines and Minerals <3^99(2) 
General partner could not attack issue 
of whether limited partner had satisfied his 
capital funding obligation on theory that 
some of the money furnished was used in 
leaching operation instead of in under-
ground mining development, where general 
partner determined manner in which money 
received from limited partner would be 
used, and limited partnership agreement 
contained no provision depriving limited 
partner of credit against his investment 
obligation if general partner choose to use 
money for one aspect of development rath-
er than another. 
11. Pleading <s=236(3) 
Trial judge had discretion to refuse to 
permit general partner of limited partner-
ship to amend counterclaim late in trial to 
assert limited partner had not satisfied his 
investment obligation because some of the 
monies furnished were used in leaching 
operation rather than in underground min-
ing development on ground motion was un-
timely. 
12. Mines and Minerals <s=>99(2) 
Limited partnership agreement could 
not be construed to entitle limited partner 
to 25% partnership interest before total 
investment, including any net profits from 
operation leaching silver from tailings and 
dumps totalled $750,000, although agree-
ment for development of mine could be 
interpreted to require limited partner to 
invest only $400,000, not $750,000, during 
phase I, and whether partner was immedi-
ately entitled to 25% interest based upon 
his $436,000 investment accordingly should 
not have been given to jury as the agree-
ment was unambiguous on that issue. 
13. Mines and Minerals <s=>99(2) 
Limited partner was not entitled to 
25% interest in partnership for develop-
ment of mine based on his investment of 
$436,000 when total investment had not 
reached $750,000 on equitable grounds on 
theory that risk of failure in operation for 
leaching silver from tailings and dumps to 
provide the remainder of $750,000 invest-
ment should be borne exclusively by gener-
al partner. 
14. Mines and Minerals <3=>99(2) 
Limited partner did not face prospect 
of inequitable "forfeiture" if he were not 
given 25% partnership interest immediately 
upon investment of $436,000, before total 
investment reached $750,000 figure enti-
tling partner to 25% interest, although 
partner's obligation was only to invest 
$400,000; partnership agreement for devel-
opment of mine treated all funds advanced 
by limited partner as loans secured by lien 
on general partner's interest and on part-
nership itself, and limited partner was not 
forced to rely upon operation for leaching 
silver from tailing and dumps to complete 
the $750,000 investment, but could make 
additional contributions. 
15. Mines and Minerals <3=>99(2) 
Limited partner was entitled to have 
its advances to limited partnership treated 
as loans, in accordance with partnership 
agreement for development of mine, al-
though total investment in phase I had not 
reached $750,000 figure, as the agreement 
provided that all advances by the limited 
partners were loans. 
Lloyd J. Webb (Webb, Burton, Carlson. 
Pedersen & Webb), Twin Falls, for defen-
dant-appellant. 
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, Utah, and Ter-
ry R. McDaniel (Nelson, Rosholt, Robert-
son, Tolman & Tucker), Boise, for plaintiff-
respondent. 
BURNETT, Judge. 
"Resolve me of all ambiguities!" This 
lament of Christopher Marlowe, the six-
teenth century poet-playwright, echoes in 
the case now oefore us. The appeal arises 
from a dispute over the language of an 
agreement for development of a silver 
mine. We must decide whether the agree-
ment is ambiguous and, if so, whether the 
district court properly resolved the ambi-
guity, giving the agreement its intended 
meaning. For reasons explained below, we 
affirm the district court's judgment in part, 
vacate it in part, and remand the case. 
I 
The facts essential to our opinion are 
undisputed. In Box Elder County, Utah, 
one mile south of the Idaho boundary, lies 
a tract of land known as the Vipont Silver 
Mine. From 1919 to 1923, the mine produc-
ed more than three million ounces of silver 
and eight thousand ounces of gold. After 
the mine was closed, heaps of "tailings" 
and "dumps" remained as visual reminders 
of the wealth extracted from the earth 
below. Decades passed. Patented mining 
claims on the property were leased by the 
owner, Bannock Silver Mining Company, to 
United Silver Mines, Inc., a family corpora-
tion controlled by Thomas F. Miller. As an 
experienced geologist, Miller was convinced 
the mine could become productive again. 
He had a plan, but he needed money. 
Paul Hoffman, a venture capitalist, be-
came interested in developing the mine. 
He discussed with Miller a two-phase in-
vestment scheme. In Phase I, Hoffman 
would make $750,000 available for the con-
struction of a new tunnel and for other 
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expenditures necessary to reactivate the 
underground mining operation. In Phase 
II, Hoffman would have the option of in-
vesting an additional $1,000,000 for con-
struction of a mill to process the extracted 
ores. This seemingly simple proposal be-
came complex as details were studied and 
new ideas were propounded. The negotia-
tions took a fateful turn when the parties 
discussed the possibility of leaching silver 
from the "tailings" and "dumps" above 
ground. The leaching operation came to be 
regarded as a potential source of funds for 
the underground mining project. As the 
parties attempted to define the role of the 
leaching operation in financing the Phase I 
development, they created doubt about 
Hoffman's responsibility to contribute 
$750,000 of his own money during that 
phase. The seeds of ambiguity were sown. 
One draft agreement yielded to another 
in a negotiating process that consumed sev-
eral months. Ultimately, the parties 
signed a sixteen-page agreement establish-
ing a limited partnership for development 
of the Vipont Silver Mine. Pertinent ex-
cerpts of that agreement are set forth in 
the appendix to this opinion. The agree-
ment, supplemented by a contemporaneous 
"financing agreement," provided that Mil-
ler's corporation, United Silver Mines, Inc., 
would be the general partner and that 
Hoffman would be a limited partner. The 
general partner would manage the partner-
ship's business while the limited partner 
would supply money. 
In its broad outline, the limited partner-
ship agreement adhered to the parties' 
original concept of a two-phase investment, 
the first consisting of $750,000 and the 
second (at Hoffman's option) consisting of 
$1,000,000. With respect to Phase I, the 
agreement provided that Hoffman would 
furnish $100,000 to obtain ownership of the 
leased mining claims; that Hoffman would 
transfer another $25,000 into a partnership 
bank account; and that Hoffman would 
make an additional $275,000 available, as 
needed, for work in progress. These pay-
ments would total $400,000, leaving a bal-
ance of $350,000 to be invested in Phase I. 
With respect to this balance, the agreement 
attempted to integrate Hoffman's invest-
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ment obligation with the utilization of reve-
nues expected from the leaching operation. 
Unfortunately, the agreement did not 
speak with one voice on how this inte-
gration would be achieved. In some provi-
sions, the agreement suggested that the 
$350,000 balance would come entirely from 
the leaching operation, leaving Hoffman 
with no obligation in Phase I beyond pro-
viding the initial $400,000. At section 2.2, 
certain language derived from earlier 
drafts, indicating that the limited partner 
had agreed to provide $750,000, was delet-
ed. In its place, the parties inserted a 
hand-written reference to section 3.2 of the 
agreement. Section 3.2(d) stated that 
"[t]he balance of $350,000 needed to com-
plete financing of Phase I is to come from 
revenues retained by the partnership from 
the processing of the tailings and dumps on 
the Vipont Silver Mine property, as further 
described in Section 4.1 " At section 
4.1, the agreement provided that the limit-
ed partner would be entitled to an 80% 
share of the net profits from the leaching 
operation, but that this share would be 
retained by the partnership until the $350,-
000 investment balance had been funded. 
In other provisions, however, the agree-
ment suggested that Hoffman had an ulti-
mate responsibility for making the entire 
$750,000 investment in Phase I, even if the 
leaching operation did not produce the an-
ticipated net profits. In section 2.2, where 
the parties had deleted a reference to Hoff-
man's responsibility for $750,000, the par-
ties allowed other language to remain 
which stated that Hoffman would "provide 
and/or arrange for financing in the amount 
of $1,750,000" for Phases I and II com-
bined. Section 3.2 similarly recited that the 
limited partner "agree[d] to provide and/or 
arrange for financing in the amount of 
$1,750,000 in order to assure that the part-
nership will have sufficient funds available 
to mine and process ores extracted from 
the Vipont Silver Mines." Moreover, sec-
tion 4.1(b), authorizing retention of the lim-
ited partner's 80% share of net profits from 
the leaching operation until $350,000 had 
been obtained, described this procedure as 
a method "to assist in financing the Phase 
I development " (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the agreement was subject to vary-
ing interpretations of the relationship be-
tween the limited partner's investment in 
Phase I and the net profits anticipated 
from the leaching operation. The agree-
ment was more clear, however, in its ex-
pression of the partnership's obligation to-
ward the limited partner. The partnership 
was required to give the limited partner 
short-term and long-term consideration for 
his investment. The short-term considera-
tion was set forth in sections 3.2(f) and 
3.2(g) of the agreement. The limited part-
ner's advances of money were character-
ized as "loans," secured by a "lien" on the 
general partner's interest and on the part-
nership itself. The "loans" were repayable 
with interest "equal to one percentage 
point above the prime interest rate " 
As explained in section 4.2, such repayment 
would be made by allocating to the limited 
partner 80% of the net revenues from the 
underground mining development and 80% 
of the net profits of the leaching operation 
(after $350,000 had been retained for the 
Phase I development). 
The long-term consideration for the limit-
ed partner's investment was described in 
section 4.3 of the agreement. The limited 
partner would receive 25% of the partner-
ship's future net revenues after the 
"loans" had been repaid. Section 4.3 stat-
ed that the limited partner would be "enti-
tled" to this "25% interest in the partner-
ship as soon as the Phase I development 
has been completed through the expendi-
ture of the $750,000 which will be required 
therefor." l Similarly, section 9.5 stated 
that "[i]n the event Phase I is completed 
. . . the limited partner shall be entitled to a 
25% interest " Thus, the agreement 
1. Section 4.3 further provided that the limited 
partner would receive an additional 25% inter-
est if he participated fully in Phase II, requiring 
an expenditure of $1,000,000. The same section 
went on to say that if the limited partner fur-
nished or arranged for total financing less than 
the total of $1,750,000 for Phases I and II, his 
future interest would be "decreased proportion-
ately" from the 50% he otherwise would have 
been entitled to receive. Although this language 
raises a question of whether the limited partner 
might be entitled to some fractional interest 
plainly contemplated that Phase I would be 
completed, and the limited partner's entitle-
ment to a 25% interest would arise, only 
when the expenditure of $750,000 had oc-
curred. On this point, sections 4.3 and 9.5 
were consistent with section 3.2, which de-
fined Phase I as "[t]he period of time dur-
ing which the initial $750,000 . . . is being 
spent " 
Thus, the agreement was clear in one 
respect but unclear in another. It was 
clear in its delineation of the limited part-
ner's rights upon completion of Phase I. 
But it was unclear on whether his obli-
gation during that phase was to invest 
$750,000, or to invest $400,000 with the 
other $350,000 coming from the leaching 
operation. Despite this imperfection, the 
agreement was signed and the partnership 
began to develop the Vipont Silver Mine. 
Hoffman contributed approximately $436,-
000 to the partnership. The general part-
ner, United Silver, used some of this money 
to start the leaching operation. The reve-
nues derived from that operation were di-
sappointing. Although the record does not 
show precisely what revenues were gener-
ated, nor whether any such revenues were 
"net" after deduction of costs, it is undis-
puted that the leaching operation had fall-
en short—by the time this case was tried— 
of providing sufficient net profits to bridge 
the gap between Hoffman's investment of 
$436,000 and the Phase I requirement of 
$750,000. 
When problems in the leaching operation 
became apparent, Hoffman requested more 
detailed reports on the partnership's activi-
ties. Dissatisfied with the reports re-
ceived, he demanded access to the partner-
ship's books. When United Silver, as the 
general partner, did not comply, Hoffman 
even if he made a contribution of less than 
$750,000 for Phase I, Hoffman has made no 
such argument in this litigation. He appears to 
accept an interpretation of section 4.3 which 
makes the proportionate reduction language ap-
plicable only to a contribution of less than 
$1,000,000 in Phase II. With respect to the 25% 
interest available for Phase I, Hoffman's posi-
tion is that he has fully performed his obligation 
by furnishing more than $400,000. He has 
made no claim to any proportionately decreased 
share based on partial performance. 
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brought this suit. He asked the court to 
compel a full accounting; to grant access 
to the partnership's books; to award dam-
ages for denial of access to those books; 
and to declare that he had fully performed 
his obligation in Phase I, entitling him to a 
25% interest in the partnership. The gen-
eral partner counterclaimed, alleging that 
Hoffman had breached an obligation to fur-
nish $750,000. The general partner sought 
damages for the alleged breach and a dec-
laration that Hoffman was entitled to noth-
ing from the partnership. 
The district court held that the limited 
partnership agreement was ambiguous 
with respect to Hoffman's obligation dur-
ing Phase I. The judge tendered the issue 
to a jury upon special interrogatories. As 
we will explain more fully in the next part 
of this opinion, the jury determined that 
Hoffman was entitled to a 25% interest in 
the partnership upon furnishing $400,000. 
The district court entered judgment upon 
the verdict, declaring Hoffman to be the 
owner of a 25% interest and awarding him 
other relief. This appeal followed. 
II 
As we turn to the issues, we acknowl-
edge the extraordinary burden this litiga-
tion has placed upon the parties, their coun-
sel and the district court. For nearly five 
years, the case went through extensive dis-
covery, a host of pretrial proceedings, a 
jury trial and numerous post-trial motions. 
On appeal, the attorneys filed more than 
200 pages of briefs (excluding appendices), 
containing a virtual cyclopedia of legal 
principles governing the construction of 
contracts, jury verdicts and special inter-
rogatories. Despite this remarkable effort 
by counsel, we believe the appeal may be 
decided on just two dispositive issues: (a) 
2. In the discussion which follows, we rely upon 
principles of Idaho law and cite Idaho authori-
ties. In so doing, we are not unmindful of 
provisions in the limited partnership agreement 
indicating that laws of other states might be 
applicable. At section 1.1, the agreement recites 
that the limited partnership is formed pursuant 
to the Utah Limited Partnership Act. The agree-
ment further states, at section 10.4, that during 
Phase I the agreement shall be construed and 
enforced according to the laws of the State of 
(Idaho App. 1989) 
whether the limited partnership agreement 
was ambiguous, as the district court held; 
and, if so, (b) whether the question of inter-
pretation was properly put to the jury and 
ultimately reflected in the judgment. We 
will discuss these issues in turn. 
A 
The parties have presented a full spec-
trum of arguments on the issue of ambi-
guity. United Silver contends that the con-
tract was not ambiguous—that it clearly 
required the limited partner to furnish the 
entire $750,000 investment in Phase I, re-
gardless of the results obtained from the 
leaching operation. Accordingly, United 
Silver urges that it should have received a 
directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. In con-
trast, Hoffman argues that if the agree-
ment indeed was unambiguous, it clearly 
required him only to provide $400,000 in 
Phase I. Both parties also argue, in the 
alternative, that if the agreement was am-
biguous, the evidence of intent favored 
their respective positions. 
[1-3] Whether an agreement is ambigu-
ous is a question of law.2 E.g., DeLancey 
v, DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 
(1986). If the contract is not ambiguous, 
its interpretation is another question of 
law, to be determined by the trial judge 
rather than by a jury. E.g., Luzar v. West-
ern Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 
337 (1984). Conversely, if a contract is 
ambiguous, its meaning turns on the under-
lying intent of the parties. Intent is a 
question of fact, to be determined by a jury 
in light of the language of the entire agree-
ment, the parties' conduct, the course of 
prior negotiations, and other extrinsic in-
formation. Olmstead v. Heidelberg Inn, 
Inc., 105 Idaho 774, 673 P.2d 76 (Ct.App. 
Illinois. Nevertheless, the limited partner chose 
to bring this lawsuit in Idaho, presumably be-
cause the general partner—United Silver Mines, 
Inc., controlled by Thomas F. Miller—has its 
principal office in Oakley, Idaho. Neither of 
the parties has argued that Utah or Illinois law 
is materially different from Idaho law with re-
spect to the issues addressed in today's opinion. 
Indeed, Hoffman's counsel has described the 
choice of law issue as "academic." Consequent-
ly, we do not tarry over it. 
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1983); Bennett v. Bliss, 103 Idaho 358, 647 
P.2d 814 (Ct.App.1982). 
[4-6] Here, as we have noted, the dis-
trict judge deemed the limited partnership 
agreement to be ambiguous with respect to 
whether the limited partner was required 
to furnish the full $750,000, or only $400,-
000 of that amount, in order to fulfill his 
obligation in Phase I. This determination 
of ambiguity is subject to free review on 
appeal. Clearwater Minerals Corp. v. 
Presnell, 111 Idaho 945, 729 P.2d 420 (Ct. 
App.1986). A contract is ambiguous, as a 
matter of law, if it is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations. Rutter v. 
McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 
(1980); Newman v. Associated Systems, 
Inc., 107 Idaho 922, 693 P.2d 1124 (CtApp. 
1985). In Part I of this opinion, we have 
identified two varying interpretations that 
might have been given to the language in 
the limited partnership agreement which 
attempted to integrate the limited partner's 
investment with the utilization of net prof-
its from the leaching operation. Both of 
these interpretations are reasonable. Ac-
cordingly, we uphold the district judge's 
ruling that the agreement was ambiguous 
on this point. The judge properly tendered 
the issue to the jury for a determination of 
the parties' underlying intent. 
[7] During the trial, the individuals who 
negotiated the agreement—Hoffman and 
Miller—testified at length regarding the 
purposes of the limited partnership and the 
significance of particular words chosen or 
deleted from the final draft of the agree-
ment. In addition, an attorney (other than 
present counsel for the parties) testified as 
to his participation in the drafting process. 
He presented copies of several "marked 
up" drafts depicting the evolution of the 
agreement. We need not recount the evi-
dence in detail here. It is sufficient to say 
that the record contains substantial evi-
dence in support of the jury's determina-
3. United Silver further contends that because 
this error was contained in a compound inter-
rogatory, it infected the jury's determination of 
the limited partner's obligation. Thus, United 
Silver asks us to order a new trial due to a 
"failure of the adjudicatory process." We are 
not persuaded that the error had such sweeping 
tion that the parties intended to impose 
upon the limited partner an obligation only 
to furnish $400,000 during Phase I, the 
remaining $350,000 to come from the leach-
ing operation. The jury's verdict on that 
point will not be disturbed. 
B 
[8-11] A more subtle and troubling 
question is whether this determination by 
the jury constituted a sufficient basis for 
the district court to enter a judgment de-
claring that Hoffman had become the own-
er of a 25% interest in the partnership. 
The trial judge evidently treated this 25% 
entitlement as an automatic and immediate 
consequence of Hoffman's performance of 
his obligation—as determined by the jury— 
to furnish $400,000 in Phase I. Indeed, the 
jury made that determination in response 
to a special interrogatory which combined 
the issues of performance and entitlement 
to a percentage share of the partnership: 
As you, the jury, interpret the Limited 
Partnership Agreement (Exhibit P-5), 
was the plaintiff Paul Hoffman entitled 
to a 25% interest in the Limited Partner-
ship upon his lending to the Limited Part-
nership the sum of $400,000, with the 
remaining $350,000 anticipated to com-
plete "Phase I" of development of the 
mine to come from funds generated and 
retained by the partnership through the 
leaching operation? 
The jury answered "yes" to this compound 
question. United Silver now contends that 
the performance and entitlement questions 
should have been framed separately, as 
United Silver had suggested in its request-
ed jury instructions and interrogatories. 
In any event, United Silver argues, the 
judge erred by equating performance of 
the $400,000 investment obligation with an 
immediate entitlement to a 25% interest in 
the partnership.3 
effect. We acknowledge that compound inter-
rogatories are discouraged. See generally 
Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 
(1976). However, jury instructions and inter-
rogatories must be examined as a whole. Eg., 
Zolber v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712 P.2d 525 
(1985). Having done so in this case, and having 
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[12] As we have explained, the limited 
partnership agreement dealt separately 
with the limited partner's obligation in 
Phase I and the limited partner's entitle-
ment upon completion of that phase. Al-
though the agreement was not clear on the 
first issue, it was clear on the second. It 
stated that the limited partner would be 
entitled to the 25% interest "as soon as the 
Phase I development has been completed 
through the expenditure of the $750,000 
which will be required therefor." Thus, 
although the agreement could be interpret-
ed—as the jury found—to permit an outlay 
of $400,000 by the limited partner during 
Phase I, it could not be construed as enti-
tling him to a 25% interest before the total 
investment, including any net profits from 
the leaching operation, totaled $750,000. 
On this point, the agreement was unambig-
uous. Therefore, with all due respect to 
the district court, we hold that the judge 
erred in giving the immediate entitlement 
issue to the jury. The error was merely 
exacerbated by framing the issue in a com-
pound interrogatory. The error subse-
quently was replicated in the court's judg-
ment upon the verdict, declaring Hoffman 
to be the present owner of a 25% interest 
based upon his payment of at least $400,-
000 during Phase I. 
[13] During oral argument on appeal, 
Hoffman's counsel acknowledged with 
commendable candor that the agreement 
did not provide an immediate entitlement to 
a 25% interest for an investment of at least 
$400,000 but less than $750,000. Charac-
terizing this as a "hiatus" in the contract, 
counsel argued that the judgment giving 
Hoffman a present interest of 25% should 
viewed the instructions and interrogatories in 
the context of the evidence at trial, we believe 
the jury's determination regarding the $400,000 
obligation was properly focused on the issue of 
the parties' intent. 
United Silver also has attacked the compound 
interrogatory from another direction, arguing 
that it failed to frame yet another issue—wheth-
er, if Hoffman's obligation in Phase I was to 
furnish only $400,000, he actually fulfilled that 
obligation since some of the money was used in 
the leaching operation rather than in the under-
ground mining development. This attack is ill-
founded. United Silver, as the general partner, 
determined the manner in which money re-
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be upheld on "equitable" grounds. He 
urged that the risk of failure in the leach-
ing operation should be borne exclusively 
by the general partner and that an immedi-
ate entitlement to the 25% interest would 
avoid a "forfeiture" of Hoffman's $436,000 
investment. 
We disagree. By using the term "hia-
tus," counsel implies that the agreement is 
flawed by a void, or discontinuity, which 
must be filled by an equitable remedy. We 
perceive no such flaw. There is nothing 
illogical about an agreement which allows 
the limited partner to rely on the leaching 
operation to fund part of the $750,000 in-
vestment but which still requires the entire 
$750,000 to be attained before the limited 
partner receives his 25% long-term interest. 
Of course, there is a risk that funds de-
rived from the leaching operation will be 
inadequate or will be realized more slowly 
than the limited partner would prefer. 
However, the agreement does not make the 
general partner a guarantor of the leaching 
operation's performance. At section 4.1, 
referring to the "tailings" and "dumps," 
the agreement describes the leaching oper-
ation as a process of "recovering minerals 
which may be contained therein." (Empha-
sis added.) 
[14] Neither are we persuaded that the 
limited partner faces the prospect of an 
inequitable "forfeiture" if he is not given 
an immediate 25% interest. As mentioned 
earlier, the agreement treats all funds ad-
vanced by the limited partner as "loans," 
secured by a "lien" on the general part-
ner's interest and on the partnership itself. 
Moreover, the limited partner is not forced 
ceived from the limited partner would be uti-
lized. The limited partnership agreement con-
tained no provision depriving the limited part-
ner of credit against his investment obligation if 
the general partner chose to use the money for 
one aspect of the development rather than an-
other. Moreover, we note that United Silver did 
not present this issue below until it moved to 
amend its counterclaim late in the trial. The 
trial judge denied that motion, deeming it to be 
untimely. The ruling was well within the 
judge's sound discretion. See generally Cougar 
Bay Company, Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 597 
P.2d 1070 (1979). 
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to rely upon the leaching operation to com-
plete the Phase I investment. He is at 
liberty to make additional contributions, 
which also will be treated as lien-secured 
loans, in order to reach the $750,000 figure. 
Indeed, the agreement provides at section 
4.1(d) that the limited partner, "at his dis-
cretion/' may advance money to supple-
ment the cash flow from the leaching oper-
ation. Hoffman's election not to make 
such further advances may be a sound 
weighing of business risks on his part, but 
it triggers no equitable entitlement to a 
25% interest in the partnership at a time 
earlier than the contract clearly provides. 
[15] Therefore, although we sustain the 
district court's determination that it is per-
missible for the limited partner to invest 
$400,000 in Phase I, leaving the balance of 
$350,000 to be funded by the leaching oper-
ation, we also hold that any entitlement to 
a 25% long-term interest in the partnership 
must await the completion of Phase I 
through an aggregate investment of $750,-
000. That portion of the district court's 
judgment which declares Hoffman present-
ly to have "a twenty-five percent (25%) 
ownership interest in [the] partnership" is 
hereby set aside. The district court is in-
structed to modify the judgment on re-
mand. The remainder of the judgment— 
denominating funds advanced by the limit-
ed partner as "loans," ordering a formal 
accounting and periodic audits of the part-
nership's books, and awarding $1,500 in 
damages for earlier denial of access to the 
books—is affirmed.4 No costs or attorney 
fees are awarded on appeal. 
WALTERS, C.J., and SWANSTROM, 
J., concur. 
APPENDIX 
EXCERPTS FROM LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP 
AGREEMENT 
This Agreement of Limited Partnership, 
entered into and effective as of the 30th 
4. United Silver has questioned the treatment of 
Hoffman's advances to date as loans. However, 
the agreement states that "all" advances by the 
limited partner are loans. The agreement does 
not state that the advances must total $750,000 
day of April, 1977, by and between UNT 
ED SILVER MINES, INC., a Utah Corp 
ration, (hereinafter referred to as the "Ge-
eral Partner"), and PAUL HOFFMAN, 
resident of the State of Indiana, (hereii 
after referred to as the ''Limited Partner" 
* * * * * * 
Section 1.1—Formation of Partnership 
The parties hereto hereby form a Limite 
Partnership pursuant to the provisions o 
Utah Code Annotated 48-2-1 et sea 
(1953) and in accordance with the prov: 
sions of this Agreement, which organiza 
tion is referred to herein as the "Partner 
ship". 
* * * * * * 
Section 2.1—Purposes and Powers of tht 
Partnership: 
The general purpose of the Partnership 
shall be to invest in, explore for, and en 
gage in the business of mining silver anr 
other ores, principally on property locatec 
in the State of Utah, known as the Viponi 
Silver Mine. 
* * * * * * 
Section 2.2—Expenditure of Capital: 
The primary purpose of the Partnership 
is the business of mining silver and other 
ores, the milling and processing of the ex-
tracted ores, and the sale of the end prod-
ucts of the milling and processing opera-
tions primarily on property located in the 
State of Utah, known as the Vipont Silver 
Mine, which is covered by a "Mine Lease" 
which is to be contributed to the Partner-
ship by the General Partner, as described 
hereinafter. It is contemplated that the 
Limited Partner will provide and/or ar-
range for financing in the amount of 
$1,750,000.00 in order to assure that the 
Partnership will have sufficient funds 
available for such mining and processing. 
The manner in which this financing is to be 
provided is set forth in further detail here-
inafter and in a separate agreement enti-
before any of them constitutes a loan. We have 
examined other issues raised by United Silver, 
and we deem them either to be without merit or 
to be answered by the analysis contained in this 
opinion. 
HOFFMAN v. UNITED 
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tied "Financing Agreement". The period 
of time during which the initial $750,000.00 
(which the Limited Partner has agreed to 
provide or assure is available) See 3.2. by c, 
d. P.H. T.F.M. [handwritten alteration by 
parties] is being spent shall be referred to 
as "Phase I" and the period during which 
the final $1,000,000.00 (which the Limited 
Partner has agreed to provide and/or ar-
range for) is being spent shall be referred 
to as "Phase II". 
* * * * * * 
Section 3.2—Contribution by Limited 
Partner: 
The Limited Partner agrees to provide 
and/or arrange for financing in the amount 
of $1,750,000.00 in order to assure that the 
Partnership will have sufficient funds 
available to mine and process ores extract-
ed from the Vipont Silver Mine. 
a) Immediately upon the signing of this 
Agreement the Limited Partner agrees to 
transfer to the Partnership 2,150,000 
shares of stock in Bannock Silver Mining 
Company which it has acquired. The par-
ties agree that for purposes of this Agree-
ment the 2,150,000 shares of Bannock stock 
shall be valued at $100,000.00. 
b) Also upon the signing of this Agree-
ment the Limited Partner agrees to trans-
fer $25,000.00 into a Partnership bank ac-
count and to thereafter replenish the bank 
account balance monthly to this level in 
order to provide working capital for the 
venture. 
c) Thereafter, at the times and under the 
circumstances set forth in the Financing 
Agreement which is being executed this 
same date, the Limited Partner agrees to 
provide and/or arrange for $275,000.00 as 
required in purchasing equipment and sup-
plies and providing working capital for the 
Partnership. 
d) The balance of $350,000.00 needed to 
complete the financing of Phase I is to 
come from revenues retained by the Part-
nership from the processing of the tailings 
and dumps on the Vipont Silver Mine prop-
erty, as further described in Section 4.1 of 
this Agreement. 
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e) The parties contemplate that Phase I 
will be completed sometime in 1978. Upon 
the completion of Phase I, the Limited 
Partner has an option for ninety (90) days 
to provide and/or arrange for additional 
financing in the amount of $1,000,000.00 in 
order to complete the Phase II development 
of the Vipont Silver Mine. If the additional 
$1,000,000.00 in financing is not provided 
and/or arranged for within the ninety (90) 
day period, the Limited Partner loses all 
right to participate in the Phase II develop-
ment. The conditions and circumstances 
under which the contribution of this addi-
tional financing will occur are further set 
forth in the Financing Agreement which is 
being executed this same date. 
f) All contributions to the Partnership by 
the Limited Partner shall be regarded as 
loans, to be repaid in accordance with Sec-
tion 4.2 hereof. Each loan shall bear inter-
est on the unpaid balance of principal at a 
rate which is equal to one percentage point 
above the prime interest rate as determined 
by the First National City Bank of New 
York at the time that the loan is made. 
g) In order to secure the repayment of the 
contributions of the Limited Partner as pro-
vided for hereinabove, the Limited Partner 
shall be entitled to hold and claim a lien 
upon the interest of the General Partner 
and the Partnership in the Vipont Silver 
Mine property and upon any minerals pro-
duced therefrom until the contributions 
have been fully repaid. 
* * * * * * 
Section lf.1—Sharing of Net Revenues 
from Processing of Eristing Tailings and 
Dumps: 
There are presently tailings and dumps 
on the Vipont Silver Mine property which 
the parties anticipate processing for the 
purpose of recovering minerals which may 
be contained therein. All net revenues re-
alized from the processing of existing tail-
ings and dumps (gross revenue less the 
costs which may be properly allocated to 
processing these tailings and dumps) shall 
be divided and applied as follows: 
a) 20% to the General Partner. 
b) 80% to be retained by the Partnership to 
assist in financing the Phase I development 
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until a total of $350,000.00 has been re-
tained. 
c) After the Partnership has retained 
$350,000.00 the balance of the 80% share 
shall go to the Limited Partner to be ap-
plied to loans which he has made to the 
Partnership or, in the discretion of the Lim-
ited Partner, to be used for additional mine 
development. 
d) The parties agree that underground 
mine development will not begin until suffi-
cient processing of the tailings and dumps 
has occurred that, in the judgment of the 
Partners, the monthly production rate from 
the processing of the tailings and dumps 
can be determined. Once determined, if 
the status and prospects for the processing 
of the tailings and dumps are favorable (i.e. 
reasonably close to projections set out in a 
geological report on the Vipont Silver Mine 
by Thomas F. Miller dated February 10, 
197_), the Limited Partner, at his discre-
tion, agrees to advance money for the un-
derground development in the event that 
the cash flow from the processing of the 
tailings and dumps does not keep up with 
the costs of the underground development. 
Section lf.2—Repayment of Loans Made 
by the Limited Partner: 
If as a result of the underground devel-
opment of the Vipont Silver Mine which is 
anticipated by the parties hereto commer-
cial ore is recovered, the loans made to the 
Partnership by the Limited Partner shall be 
repaid out of the net revenues realized 
(gross revenues less all costs and expenses, 
direct or indirect, which may be properly 
allocated to the mining, milling and market-
ing of said ores). All such net revenues 
shall be divided 20% to the General Partner 
and 80% to the Limited Partner until the 
loans made by the Limited Partner to the 
Partnership have been fully repaid. 
Section 4-3—Sharing of Net Revenues 
from Underground Operations After the 
Loans Made by the Limited Partner Have 
Been Repaid: 
At such time as the loans made by the 
Limited Partner to the Partnership have 
been repaid, additional net revenues (gross 
revenues less all costs and expenses, direct 
or indirect, which may be properly allocat-
ed to the mining, milling and marketing oi 
said ores) shall be divided 50% to the Gen-
eral Partner and 50% to the Limited Part-
ner. This assumes that the Limited Part-
ner has provided or arranged for the full 
$1,750,000.00 to be made available to the 
Partnership to enable it to complete the 
Phase I and Phase II development. It is 
understood and agreed that the Limited 
Partner shall be entitled to a 25% interest 
in the Partnership as soon as the Phase I 
development has been completed through 
the expenditure of the $750,000.00 which 
will be required therefor. The Limited 
Partner shall be entitled to an additional 
25% interest as soon as the Phase II devel-
opment has been completed through the 
expenditure of the $1,000,000.00 which will 
be required therefor. To the extent that 
the Limited Partner provides and/or ar-
ranges for financing in an amount less 
than $1,750,000.00 his share of the net rev-
enues shall be decreased proportionately 
from the 50% that he will be entitled to 
receive if the entire $1,750,000.00 is provid-
ed and/or arranged for in accordance with 
Section 3.2 hereof. 
* * * * * * 
Section 9.5—Election by Limited Partner 
Not to Participate in Phase II: 
In the event that Phase I is completed 
and the Limited Partner is unable or elects 
not to provide and/or arrange for the fi-
nancing needed to complete Phase II, the 
parties agree that the following shall occur: 
a) The lien of the Limited Partner provided 
for by Section 3.2(g) shall continue until the 
loans made by the Limited Partner to the 
Partnership have been repaid; 
b) The Limited Partner shall be entitled to 
receive 100% of the net revenues from the 
tailings and dumps and 80% of the net 
revenues from the mine production until 
his loans have been repaid; 
c) Thereafter the Limited Partner shall be 
entitled to a 25% interest in the Partnership 
as provided for in Section 4.3. 
* * * * * * 
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Section 10.1—Entire Contract: 
This Agreement constitutes the entire 
contract between the parties and there are 
no other or further agreements outstand-
ing not specifically mentioned herein. By 
execution of this Agreement, the parties 
adopt all of the provisions of this Partner-
ship Agreement. 
* * * * * * 
Section 104—Place of Contract: 
During Phases I and II the parties agree 
that this Agreement is performable in the 
State of Illinois and shall be construed and 
enforced according to the laws of the State 
of Illinois in the courts of that State. 
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George C. SQUIRE, Jr. and Nancy 
Squire, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
EXCHANGE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a New York Corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 17505. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
April 19, 1989. 
Petition for Review Denied 
July 11, 1989. 
Insured under fire policy brought ac-
tion against insurer for bad-faith claim ad-
justment and breach of contract. The 
Third Judicial District Court, Payette Coun-
ty, G.L. Weston, J., granted summary judg-
ment for insurer on bad-faith claims, and 
insured appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Hart, J. pro tern, held that fire insurer 
1« Although Rakozy appeared as a plaintiff in 
this action, he did not participate in this appeal. 
The record does not disclose whether Rakozy is 
still a real party in interest or whether his 
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discharged contractual obligations to in-
sured by promptly acknowledging, investi-
gating, and paying, based upon good-faith 
evaluation, insured's claim, and thus was 
not liable for bad-faith claim adjustment. 
Affirmed. 
Insurance 6»602.5 
Fire insurer discharged contractual ob-
ligations to insured by promptly acknowl-
edging, investigating, and paying, based 
upon good-faith evaluation, insured's claim, 
and thus was not liable for bad-faith claim 
adjustment; payment delays were attribut-
able to coverage questions which were 
"fairly debatable." 
Darrel W. Aherin, Aherin & Rice, Lewi-
ston, for plaintiffs-appellants. 
Bruce R. McAllister, Quane, Smith, Ho-
ward & Hull, Boise, for defendant-respon-
dent. 
HART, Judge Pro Tern. 
INTRODUCTION 
This action arose after a fire damaged 
appellant George Squire's office. Squire 
was the beneficiary of a fire insurance 
policy issued by respondent Exchange In-
surance Company. Squire and his wife, 
Nancy, and Bernie Rakozy, their bankrupt-
cy trustee, alleged in their complaint that 
Exchange failed to properly adjust and pay 
their claim.1 Squires sought damages 
against Exchange under the theories of 
breach of contract and bad faith claim ad-
justment; they also sought punitive dam-
ages. 
Exchange moved for partial summary 
judgment. The district court granted Ex-
change's motion and entered an order dis-
missing Squire's claims for bad faith claim 
adjustment and for punitive damages. The 
district court certified its order as final and 
Squires' perfected this appeal. Squires ar-
gue that the district court erred, as genu-
claims have been settled. For the purpose of 
this appeal only, we have deleted his name from 
the caption of the case. 
i&'jiaf* 
Portions of 
Affidavit of Ray G. Martineau re Costs and Attorneys Fees 
(pages R. 1432-46 and 1462-92 are omitted) 
02-22-85 Iws 
02-26-85 lws 
03-09-85 rgm 
03-10-85 rgm 
03-11-85 rgm 
03-12-85 rgm 
7.00> 
02-25-85 lws ffTooy^ 
4.30 
02-27-85 rgm C O ^ ) 
02-27-85 lws C2.00 
03-01-85 lws 5.30 
03-04-85 lws .50 
03-08-85 rgm 1.50 
2.50 
5.00 
7-00 
8.50 
Research and study; preparation of 
correspondence, pleadings re motion for 
partial summary judgment 
Review Hoffman file; research re marke-
table title 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; prepara-
tion of memo in opposition to motion
 %for 
summary judgment; preparation of amended 
complaint 
Preparation of amended complaint and 
discovery 
Preparation of motion to strike and sup-
porting memorandum, request for oral 
argument and memorandum in opposition to 
motion for partial summary judgment; 
research and study 
Research memo in opposition to summary 
judgment 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; prepara-
tion of amended complaint 
Proof of amended complaint 
Preparation of amended complaint; review 
of title documents 
Preparation of amended complaint, second 
set of interrogatories and second request 
for production of document 
Preparation of amended complaint, second 
set of interrogatories and request for 
production of documents 
Telephone calls Tom Slaughter, Gary 
Packer; preparation of amended complaint, 
second set of interrogatories, and 
request for production of documents; 
research re title documents and 
encumbrances 
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Lloyd Webb, 
Judge Call; preparation of amended 
complaint, second set of interrogatories 
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and request for production of documents; 
research and study 
03-12-85 lws 
03-13-85 tvc 
03-13-85 lws 
03-14-85 rgm 
03-14-85 tvc 
03-14-85 lws 
03-15-85 rgm 
03-15-85 tvc 
03-18-85 tvc 
03-19-85 tvc 
03-20-85 lws 
03-21-85 ska 
03-21-85 lws 
03-25-85 tvc 
03-26-85 lws 
J.5_0_ 
50 
Hl^/Z. 
Cj^ooJ) 
6.50 
6.00 
33, 
4.00 
Conference Ray G. Martineau 
Review of agreements and correspondence 
re rights and ownership 
Research legal status of dumps and 
tailings 
Preparation of amended complaint, second 
set of interrogatories and request for 
production of documents; research and 
study of partnership, contract and title 
issued 
Review of title and contract documents; 
Review of amended complaint 
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Tom 
Slaughter; preparation, filing and ser-
vice of amended complaint; preparation of 
second set of interrogatories and request 
for production of documents; research of 
partnership and dump ownership issues and 
related matters 
Review and analysis of documents re 
agreement between Dore and United, 
depositions, correspondence, etc. 
Review of documents 
Review of documents 
Preparation of interrogatories 
Legal research and analysis of damages 
Preparation of interrogatories and 
request for admissions 
Review of documents and cross reference 
lists and sources 
Proof and review of interrogatories 
-9-
03-28-85 tvc 
03-29-85 tvc 
03-29-85 ska 
04-01-85 rgm 
04-01-85 tvc 
04-01-85 lws 
04-02-85 rgm 
04-02-85 lws 
04-03-85 rgm 
04-03-85 ska 
04-03-85 lws 
04-04-85 rgm 
04-04-85 lws 
04-10-85 rgm 
3.00 
1.50 
^——r-
4.0CL 
1.50 
.25 
3.00 
1.50 
6_JH 
2.00 
.50^ 
0 0 ^ 
3.00 
2.00 
Review of draft of second set of 
interrogatories; preparation of schedule 
of legal fees and costs to date 
Review of interrogatories 
Legal research and analysis and prepara-
tion of memo re measure of damages for 
breach of agreement to loan money 
Telephone calls Tom Slaugftter; review of 
interrogatories and request for produc-
tion of documents, request for admissions 
Discussion Leslie Slaugh re interroga-
tories and request for production of 
documents 
Preparation of interrogatories, request 
for production of documents 
Preparation of interrogatories, request 
for production and request for admissions 
Research status of dumps and tailings 
Preparation of interrogatories, request 
for production and requests for 
admissions; telephone calls Lloyd Webb 
Preparation of memo re damages for 
failure to extend line of credit 
Research re status of dumpings and 
tailings; preparation of requests for 
production of documents 
Preparation of interrogatories, request 
for production, request for admissions, 
securing abstract of title to mining 
claims; research and study 
Preparation of memo re status of dumps 
and tailings 
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Robert 
Anderson; preparation of second round of 
discovery 
-10-
04-11-85 rgm 4.50 
04-12-85 lws 
04-15-85 lws 
1.40 
4.00 
04-19-85 rgm 2.25 
04-23-85 lws 
04-26-85 lws Vl.00 
04-29-85 rgm (^1.25^) 
04-30-85 rgm C^TTJT) 
04-30-85 lws 
05-02-85 lws 
05-03-85 rgm 
05-03-85 lws .50 
05-06-85 rgm (^25 
05-13-85 tvc 
.50 
2.00 
5.50 
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Robert 
Anderson; preparation of second set of 
interrogatories, second request for pro-
duction of documents and request for 
admissions; preparation of correspondence 
and related matters 
Preparation and review discovery requests 
Preparation and review of discovery 
requests; review answers and counterclaim 
Telephone calls Gary Packerd, Robert 
Anderson; research and study re motion 
for partial summary judgment; preparation 
of second set of interrogatories, request 
for production of documents 
Review memo in support of motion for sum-
mary judgment 
Review status of Dumps 
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Judge Call; 
preparation of motion re hearing on 
motion for summary judgment; research 
Preparation of motion for extension of 
time, memorandum, and correspondence 
Preparation of motion for extension of 
time and supporting memo 
Preparation of counterclaim 
Telephone calls Judge Omer Call, Gary 
Packard; preparation of response to Uni-
ted?s motion for partial summary judgment 
Review of reply to counterclaim 
Telephone calls Gary Packard, Robert 
Anderson, Lloyd Webb; preparation of 
response to United's motion for partial 
summary judgment 
Review of files; preparation of analysis 
and comparison of billings for work done 
on the Vipont confirmation project 
-1 1-
14 50 
05-14-85 tvc 6.00 
05-15-85 tvc 4.00 
05-16-85 tvc 6.00 
05-17-85 tvc 1.00 
05-17-85 lws .75 
05-21-85 rgm (^f^zE^ 
05-21-85 tvc 1.75 
05-21-85 lws 
05-22-85 tvc C4T5OJ 
05-22-85 ska 
05-22-85 lws 
05-23-85 rgm 
6.60^  
05-23-85 tvc 2.00 
05-23-85 lws ( 3 T S ) 
05-24-85 lws 7.00 
Preparation of memorandum in opposition 
to motion for summary judgment; research 
and study 
Analysis and comparison of billings and 
review 
Review of file; preparation of summary 
and analysis 
Continued review and summary of file 
Conference Leslie W. Slaugh re analysis 
and review 
Conference 
Preparation of response to motion for 
summary judgment 
Review of accounting questions re docu-
mentation for charges by United to Dore 
Review partnership agreement 
Organize file for correspondence in chro-
nological order and raailgrams extending 
option 
Obtaining limited partnership certificate 
from court clerk 
Research re concurrent covenants and per-
formance; preparation of statement of 
facts 
Preparation of response to United's 
motion for summary judgment; research and 
study 
File organization 
Review of documents and file; preparation 
of statement of facts 
Review of partnership agreement; review 
of Idaho case; preparation of statement 
of facts 
-12-
1451 
& 05-28-85 rgm ( ^ • ^ ^ l ?
 T e l e P h o n e calls Robert Anderson; review 
of answers to interrogatories and 
response to request for admissions; 
research and study; preparation of 
response to motion for partial summary 
judgment; review of contractual obliga-
tions; preparation of correspondence and 
option extension mailgrams 
05-28-85 lws Ql.OOy Preparation of memo in opposition to sum-
mary judgment 
05-29-85 lws C 6.5JXX Telephone calls Harold Hintze; prepara-
tion of memo in opposition to summary 
judgment; review answers to interroga-
tories 
05-30-85 rgm (FlOO^y Preparation of response to United's 
motion for partial summary judgment; 
research of ownership of dumps and 
tailings, Utah partnership act 
05-30-85 lws (3-00/ Proof and review of memo in opposition to 
summary judgment 
06-03-85 lws (^2.00) Proof of memo re summary judgment 
06-04-85 lws (TfoO^) Review of memo re summary judgment 
06-10-85 rgm C?i£5^/2. Preparation of motion for partial summary 
judgment and memo; review of answers to 
interrogatories and accompanying docu-
ments 
06-10-85 lws .30 Telephone calls Lloyd Webb re production 
of documents; review exhibits to answers 
to interrogatories 
06-11-85 rgm C?'^2x Preparation of memorandum in opposition 
to motion for partial summary judgment; 
preparation of plaintiff's motion for 
partial summary judgment 
06-12-85 rgm QLi^^ Telephone calls Robert Anderson, Lloyd 
Webb; review of Hoffman case files; pre-
paration and review of correspondence; 
preparation of Dorers motion for partial 
summary judgment and memorandum in 
opposition to United's motion for partial 
summary judgment 
-13-
1452 
0 6-12-85 lws 
07-02-85 t v c 
07-04-85 rgm 
07-15-85 lws 
07-16-85 lws 
07-17-85 lws 
06-13-85 lws 
06-14-85 lws 
06-19-85 rgm 
06-19-85 lws 
06-21-85 rgm d 3 ) 
06-25-85 rgrn ( j _ J i ^ 
06-26-85 rgm CP 
06-26-85 
06-27-85 
06-28-85 
07-01-85 
07-01-85 
lws 
lws 
rgm 
rgm 
t v c 
C^soy (USD 
GD 
(3D 
1.50 
2.00 
(±75) 
Preparation of memo in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment 
Review of memo re summary judgment 
Preparation of memo re summary judgment 
Preparation of memo in opposition to 
motion for partial summary judgment 
Preparation of correspondence to Thomas 
Church; Review memo re summary judgment 
Preparation of memo in opposition to 
motion for partial summary judgment 
Research and study of Hoffman file and 
title records to mining property 
Preparation of memorandum in opposition 
to United?s motion for partial summary 
judgment 
Research re effect of breach of contract 
Research re burdens of proof 
Telephone calls Lloyd Webb, Robert 
Anderson; review United documents 
Conference Robert Anderson 
Review Documents produced by defendant 
Review documents produced by United 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson, Tom 
Church, Judge Omer Call, Lloyd Webb; pre-
paration of correspondence; preparation 
for Hearing on Unitedfs motion for par-
tial summary judgment 
Review UnitedTs response to request for 
production 
Research costs plus contract law 
Preparation of memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment 
-14-
1458 
Telephone calls Tom Church, Robert 
Anderson; Preparation of memorandum re 
opposition to United!s motion for summary 
judgment; Preparation of affidavit of L. 
Robert Anderson 
Preparation of memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; review 
of correspondence; preparation of affida-
vit of Robert Anderson; preparation of 
memorandum in opposition to motion for 
partial summary judgment 
Research re patents issued 
Preparation of memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; pre-
paration of motion for partial summary 
judgment and supporting memorandum; pre-
paration of affidavit of L. Robert 
Anderson; study 
Evaluation of Bureau of land management; 
research on patents; research obtaining 
documents at bus express office 
Conference With Ray G. Martineau 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson; prepara-
tion of motion for partial summary 
judgment and supporting memorandum and 
affidavit 
Preparation of memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment; telephone 
calls Robert Anderson 
Telephone calls Robert Anderson, Judge 
Omer Call's secretary; preparation of 
motion for partial summary judgment; 
motion for leave to file oversize brief 
Preparation of motion for summary 
judgment, motion for leave to file over-
size memorandum 
-15-
1454 
07-29-85 ska .25 
07-30-85 rgm 2.25 
07-30-85 ska 
07-31-85 ska 
08-22-85 rgm 
09-04-85 lws 
09-05-85 lws 
1.25 
.25 
08-26-85 rgm ^TTooJ 
08-28-85 rgm d U l D 
08-28-85 lws 
08-30-85 rgm <^2, 
09-03-85 rgm C2.0Q, 
09-03-85 lws 
09-04-85 rgm Q T ^ F ) 
.iuoo. 
Preparation of audit letter 
Telephone calls Coopers & Lybrand, Tom 
Church, Judge Call's secretary; research 
and study 
Preparation of correspondence; review of 
files 
Research 
Telephone calls Lloyd Webb; Review 
pleadings 
Review responsive pleadings from Dore and 
preparation of correspondence; prepara-
tion for hearing in pending motions 
Review UnitedTs pleadings; preparation 
for hearing on pending motions 
Review UnitedTs memorandum on motion for 
summary judgment 
Review Unitedfs response; study 
Preparation of reply memorandum in 
response to United?s opposing memorandum; 
preparation for hearing; research and 
study 
Preparation of reply to United's memoran-
dum in opposition to summary judgment; 
telephone calls Robert Anderson; prepara-
tion motion to strike portions of 
Miller's affidavit 
Telephone calls and conferences Tom 
Slaughter, Judge Omer Call, Reed 
Hadfield; preparation of reply memoran-
dum to United!s response to motion for 
summary judgment; research and study; 
preparation for hearing 
Preparation motion to strike 
Telephone calls Harold Hintze; review 
stock certificates 
-16-
09-06-85 rgm Cf-"^) 
09-06-85 lws 
09-11-85 rgm 
09-11-85 lws 
09-12-85 rgm 
09-12-85 lws 
09-13-85 rgm 
09-13-85 lws 
09-17-85 rgm 
09-18-85 lws 
09-24-85 rgm 
09-24-85 lws 
(T._ooJ) 
(TToJ) 
(JTOJP 
09-17-85 lws G.2_o) 
09-18-85 rgm QjS) 
1.001 
c2D 
09-25-88 rgm 
09-27-85 rgm ( j .00^) 
Telephone calls Tom Slaughter; prepara-
tion of reply to UnitedTs response to 
pending motions; study 
Preparation of affidavit of Harold Hintze 
Telephone calls Tom Slaughter, Gary 
Packard; research and study; preparation 
for hearing on pending motions 
Preparation of reply memo 
Preparation of reply to Unitedfs response 
to pending motions 
Preparation reply memorandum 
Telephone calls Judge Omer Call, Tom 
Slaughter; Preparation of Slaughter and 
Hintze affidavits 
Preparation of reply memorandum in sup-
port of summary judgment; telephone calls 
Lloyd Webb 
Telephone calls Tom Slaughter; prepara-
tion of reply to United's response to 
pending motions 
Preparation of reply memorandum in sup-
port of summary judgment; preparation of 
Slaughter affidavit 
Preparation of affidavits for Tom 
Slaughter and Harold Hintze 
Preparation of affidavit of Thomas 
Slaughter 
Telephone calls Tom Slaughter, Hugh 
Shurtleff; review Tom Slaughter affida-
vit; study 
Review and correct affidavit of Thomas 
Slaughter 
Preparation and filing affidavits 
Review United's response to Dore's motion 
to strike Miller affidavit; preparation 
of correspondence 
-17-
1436 
09-30-85 lws C^y* 
10-10-85 rgm C2fc> 
02-25-86 rgm (jToO^) 
02-26-86 rgm frjj) 
02-27-86 rgm ^2.00 
03-03-86 rgm V2.00 
03-04-86 rgm (^ jOo) 
03-05-86 lws ^ 5 0 J 
03-06-86 rgm ( jToo) 
03-07-86 lws <5£> 
1.00. 
03-07-86 rgm ( i « ° 0 j 
03-08-86 rgm 
03-10-86 ska 
03-10-86 lws 
Preparation of correspondence 
Telephone call Bill Wortman, Robert 
Anderson, Judge Omer Call's secretary, 
Box Elder Countv Sheriff; preparation for 
hearing on pending motions 
Telephone calls Judge Omer Call's secre-
tary , Lloyd Webb; setting over date for 
oral argument on pending motions for sum-
mary judgment; study 
Telephone calls Bill Workman and Tom 
church; review of pending motions for 
summary judgment and supporting 
memorandum 
Preparation for hearing on pending 
motions 
Preparation for hearing on pending 
motions for summary judgment 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb, 
re settlement proposals; preparation for 
hearing on pending motions for summary 
judgment 
Review and analysis of summary judgment 
memorandums to prepare for hearing 
Preparation for hearing on pending 
motions 
Review and analysis of summary judgment 
memorandums in preparation for hearing 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb; 
preparation for hearing on pending 
motions; research and study 
Preparation for hearing on pending 
motions 
Research and analysis re updating 
memorandums 
Telephone calls Tom Church; preparation 
for hearing 
-18-
1457 
03-11-86 ska 
03-11-86 lws 
03-11-86 rgm 
03-12-86 lws 
03-12-86 rgm 
03-25-86 rgm 
5.50. 
(JLJ^ 
7.00 
50 
04-09-86 lws 
04-09-86 tvc 
04-09-86 rgm ^ 2.00 
04-14-86 rgm (^ J.25^  
04-21-86 lws 
04-22-86 lws 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb, 
Tom Church, Robert Anderson, Judge Omer 
Call!s secretary; review and com-
munication of settlement proposals; pre-
paration for hearing on pending motions 
Research and analysis re updating 
memorandums and evidence 
Review and analysis of file in prepara-
tion for hearing on motion for partial 
summary judgment 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Tom Church; 
preparation for hearing on pending 
motions 
Preparation for and attendance at hearing 
on motion for partial summary judgment; 
preparation of letter to Judge Call re 
deposition 
Preparation for and attendance at hearing 
before Judge Omer Call on pending motions 
for summary judgment; Telephone calls 
Bill Wortman 
Preparation of correspondence requesting 
copy of transcript of court hearing; 
Telephone calls court reporter 
Review and analysis of ruling on motions 
for summary judgment 
Telephone calls Gloria Wilson re 
transcripts 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Robert 
Anderson, Tom Church; review of Judge 
Callfs memorandum decision; preparation 
of correspondence; preparation of fin-
dings and order 
Preparation of findings and order 
Preparation of partial summary judgment 
and order 
Review, edit and finalize form of partial 
summary judgment 
-19-
14 
04-22-86 rgm (TTsjT) 
04-29-86 lws 
04-29-86 lws 
04-30-86 rgm 
05-01-86 lws 
C£> 
2.50, 
1.00/ 
Telephone calls Tom Church, Robert 
Anderson; preparation of order granting 
partial summary judgment 
Preparation of order for partial summary 
judgment 
Review, edit and finalize order granting 
partial summary judgment 
Review and analysis of motion for partial 
summary judgment; research and study; 
preparation of order granting partial 
summary judgment and order on motion for 
partial summary judgment 
Preparation of order specifying 
undisputed facts 
05-07-86 rgm 
05-22-86 rgm 
06-02-86 
06-02-86 rgm 
05-02-86 lws 
05-05-86 lws (2.00. 
05-06-86 lws © 
05-07-86 lws QsoJ 
C3S) 
J.75 
lws C2.50J 
1.25 
Preparation of order specifying 
undisputed facts 
Preparation of statement of uncontro-
verted facts and conclusions of law 
Review, edit and finalize statement of 
uncontroverted facts and conclusions of 
law 
Review, edit and finalize statement 
determining undisputed facts and conclu-
sions of law 
Preparation of order determining 
uncontroverted facts and conclusions of 
law and order on motions 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Lloyd Webb; 
preparation of correspondence; review of 
court orders; study 
Review and analysis of motion to amend 
findings and judgment 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman; review of 
motion re modification of partial sum-
mary judgment; preparation of correspon-
dence; study 
-20-
14 
06-09-86 lws 
06-09-86 rgm 
06-10-86 lws 
06-10-86 kjs 
06-11-86 lws 
06-11-86 kjs 
06-11-86 rgm 
06-12-86 lws 
06-17-86 rgm 
06-25-86 lws 
06-25-86 rgm 
07-10-86 rgm 
07-16-86 rgm 
5.00 
(dD 
3.50 
1.00 
1.00 
1.50 
.50 
1.25/ 
J^ O. 
Research and preparation of memorandum in 
opposition to motion to amend findings 
Preparation of memorandum in opposition 
to motion to amend findings 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman; preparation 
of response to United's pending motion 
Review, edit and finalize memorandum in 
opposition to defendant's motion to amend 
findings 
Review and analysis of motion to strike 
and memorandum in opposition to defen-
dant's motion for reconsideration 
Preparation of motion to strike motion to 
amend findings; review, edit and finalize 
memorandum in opposition to motion to 
amend findings and in support of motion 
to strike 
Review, edit and finalize memorandum in 
opposition to motion for reconsideration 
Preparation of motion to strike 
Review, edit and finalize memorandum in 
opposition to motion to amend findings 
Telephone calls Judge Call's secretary; 
Lloyd Webb; setting over hearing date; 
preparation for hearing on United's 
motions 
Review and analysis of special verdict 
from Hoffman action; preparation of 
letter to judge Call 
Telephone calls Tom Church, Robert 
Anderson; Review of Hoffman decision; 
preparation of correspondence 
Research and study; preparation for oral 
argument on pending motions 
Scheduling hearing on pending motions 
-21-
1460 
08-14-86 rgm 
08-18-86 rgm 
08-28-86 rgm 
08-29-86 rgm 
09-02-86 rgm 
09-15-86 rgm 
10-01-86 rgm 
10-03-86 rgm 
(Too) 07-22-86 rgm 
07-23-86 rgm ( 2.00 
07-23-86 lws ( 1.40. 
08-13-86 rgm ^3-50 
CSQ) 
08-19-86 rgm Q\oo) 
J.50 
dD 
,50 
50 
.25 
.25 
Telephone calls Tom Church; preparation 
for hearing on all pending motions 
Preparation for hearing on all pending 
motions 
Telephone calls judge Call's secretary, 
Tom Church; preparation for hearing on 
pending motions 
Preparation for hearing 
Telephone Call Judge Call's secretary, 
Tom Church, Lloyd Webb, Harold Hintze; 
preparation for hearing on pending 
motions 
Telephone calls Tom Church, Harold 
Hintze, securing jury instructions in 
Hoffman case; preparation for hearing on 
pending motions; research 
Telephone calls and conferences Tom 
Church, Lloyd Webb, Harold Hintze; 
research and study; preparation for and 
attendance at hearing on pending motions 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Tom Church, 
Harold Hintze; reorganizing files 
Telephone calls Pam Hunt, Tom Church, 
Leslie Slaugh; review and transmittal of 
court's memorandum decision and order 
Review and preparation of correspondence 
re Idaho judgment 
Telephone calls Bill Wortman, Tom Church; 
review of settlement possibilites 
Telephone calls Tom Church, Lloyd Webb re 
settlement possibilities 
Telephone calls Tom Church re status of 
Idaho matter 
Telephone calls Tom church re status of 
Idaho matter 
-22-
1431 
APPENDIX "K" 
mmmmmmf&mmmmmbmiMY'iiWmm* 
Defense of Counterlaim Other 
DATE $125.00 $80.00 $45.00 $40.00 $125.00 $80.00 $45.00 $40.00 
2 - 2 2 - 8 5 
2 - 2 5 - 8 5 
2 - 2 6 - 8 5 
2 - 2 7 - 8 5 
3 - 1 - 8 5 
3 - 0 4 - 8 5 
3 - 0 8 - 8 5 
3 - 0 9 - 8 5 
3 - 1 0 - 8 5 
3 - 1 1 - 8 5 
3 - 1 2 - 8 5 
3 - 1 3 - 8 5 
3 - 1 4 - 8 5 
3 - 1 5 - 8 5 
3 - 1 8 - 8 5 
3 - 1 9 - 8 5 
3 - 2 0 - 8 5 
3 - 2 1 - 8 5 
3 - 2 5 - 8 5 
3 - 2 6 - 8 5 
3 - 2 8 - 8 5 
3 - 2 9 - 8 5 
4 - 1 - 8 5 
4 - 2 - 8 5 
4 - 3 - 8 5 
4 - 4 - 8 5 
4 - 1 0 - 8 5 
4 - 1 1 - 8 5 
4 - 1 2 - 8 5 
4 - 1 5 - 8 5 
4 - 1 9 - 8 5 
4 - 2 3 - 8 5 
4 - 2 6 - 8 5 
4 - 2 9 - 8 5 
4 - 3 0 - 8 5 
5 - 2 - 8 5 
5 - 3 - 8 5 
5 - 6 - 8 5 
5 - 1 3 - 8 5 
5 - 1 4 - 8 5 
5 - 1 5 - 8 5 
5 - 1 6 - 8 5 
5 - 1 7 - 8 5 
5 - 2 1 - 8 5 
5-22-85 1 
1 . 5 0 7 . 0 0 
3 . 5 0 
3 . 2 5 2 . 0 0 
4 . 0 0 1 . 5 0 
3 . 2 5 3 . 5 0 
2 . 2 5 7 . 0 0 
6 . 7 5 
3 . 5 0 
4 . 0 0 
6 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 . 5 0 
1 . 2 5 3 . 0 0 
1 . 0 0 
. 5 0 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
1 . 2 5 1 . 1 0 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 2 5 
1 . 2 5 
2 . 7 5 2 . 0 0 
6 . 6 . 0 0 4 . 5 0 . 5 0 
3 . 5 0 
4 . 3 0 
5 . 3 0 
. 5 0 
1 . 5 0 
2 . 5 0 
5 . 0 0 
7 . 0 0 
8 . 5 0 . 2 5 
3 . 2 5 . 5 0 
2 . 2 5 
6 . 5 0 
6 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 
3 . 5 0 
4 . 0 0 
3 . 0 0 
1 . 5 0 
1 . 5 0 3 . 0 0 . 2 5 
1 . 5 0 
2 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
2 . 0 0 
4 . 5 0 
1 . 4 0 
4 . 0 0 
1 . 2 5 
. 5 0 
. 5 0 
5 . 5 0 
6 . 0 0 
4 . 0 0 
6 . 0 0 
1 . 7 5 1 . 0 0 
1 . 7 5 
1 
Defense of Counterlaim Other 
DATE $125.00 $80.00 $45.00 $40.00 $125.00 $80.00 $45.00 $40.00 
5 - 2 3 - 8 5 1 
5 - 2 4 - 8 5 
5 - 2 8 - 8 5 
5 - 2 9 - 8 5 
5 - 3 0 - 8 5 
6 - 3 - 8 5 
6 - 4 - 8 5 
6 - 1 0 - 8 5 
6 - 1 1 - 8 5 
6 - 1 2 - 8 5 
6 - 1 3 - 8 5 
6 - 1 4 - 8 5 
6 - 1 9 - 8 5 
6 - 2 1 - 8 5 
6 - 2 5 - 8 5 
6 - 2 6 - 8 5 
6 - 2 7 - 8 5 
6 - 2 8 - 8 5 
7 - 0 1 - 8 5 
7 - 2 - 8 5 
7 - 4 - 8 5 
7 - 1 5 - 8 5 
7 - 1 6 - 8 5 
7 - 1 6 - 8 5 
7 - 1 8 - 8 5 
7 - 2 2 - 8 5 
7 - 2 3 - 8 5 
7 - 2 5 - 8 5 
7 - 2 6 - 8 5 
7 - 2 9 - 8 5 
7 - 3 0 - 8 5 
7 - 3 1 - 8 5 
8 - 2 2 - 8 5 
8 - 2 6 - 8 5 
8 - 2 8 - 8 5 
8 - 3 0 - 8 5 
9 - 3 - 8 5 
9 - 4 - 8 5 
9 - 5 - 8 5 
9 - 0 6 - 8 5 
9 - 1 1 - 8 5 
9 - 1 2 - 8 5 
9 - 1 3 - 8 5 
9 - 1 7 - 8 5 
9 - 1 8 - 8 5 
1 .50 6 .50 2 . 0 0 1 
7 . 0 0 
2 . 2 5 7 . 0 0 
6 .00 1 
2 . 0 0 3 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 
1 .00 1 
1 .25 
2 . 0 0 
4 . 2 5 1 .50 1 
.30 
3 . 0 0 
1 .25 3 . 6 . 0 0 
.75 
1 .50 
.75 6 .50 
5 . 0 0 
.75 
.50 
1 .75 
5 .00 
5 .25 
1 .50 3 . 1 0 
3 . 2 5 5 . 0 0 2 . 5 0 
3 . 7 5 .50 3 
6 . 2 5 8 
.75 .10 
. 5 0 
2 . 0 0 
1 .50 1 .00 
2 . 5 0 
2 . 0 0 4 . 4 0 
5 . 2 5 4 . 0 0 
.50 
1 .25 2 . 0 0 
1 .00 4 . 0 0 
. 50 1 .00 
1 .25 1 .00 
3 . 0 0 1 .20 
1 .75 1.00 
2 . 2 5 
1 .00 .30 
1 .50 
2 . 0 
1 .50 
. 2 5 
2 . 2 5 1 .25 
.25 
2 
Defense of Counterlaim Other 
DATE $125.00 $80.00 $45.00 $40.00 $125.00 $80.00 $45.00 $40.00 
9 - 2 4 - 8 5 
9 - 2 5 - 8 5 
9 - 2 7 - 8 5 
9 - 3 0 - 8 5 
0 -10 -85 
1 .25 
. 5 0 
1.00 
. 7 5 
. 1 0 
. 1 0 
2 - 2 5 - 8 6 1 
2 - 2 6 - 8 6 
2 - 2 7 - 8 6 
3 - 3 - 8 6 
3 - 4 - 8 6 
3 - 5 - 8 6 
3 - 6 - 8 6 
3 - 7 - 8 6 
3 - 8 - 8 6 
3 - 1 0 - 8 6 
3 - 1 1 - 8 6 
3 - 1 2 - 8 6 
3 - 2 5 - 8 6 
4 - 0 9 - 8 6 
4 - 1 4 - 8 6 
4 - 2 1 - 8 6 
4 - 2 2 - 8 6 
4 - 2 9 - 8 6 
4 - 3 0 - 8 6 
5 - 1 - 8 6 
5 - 2 - 8 6 
5 - 5 - 8 6 
5 - 6 - 8 6 
5 - 7 - 8 6 
5 - 2 2 - 8 6 
6 - 2 - 8 6 
6 - 6 - 8 6 
6 - 9 - 8 6 
6 -10 -86 
6 - 1 1 - 8 6 
6 - 1 2 - 8 6 
6 - 1 7 - 8 6 
6 - 2 5 - 8 6 
7 - 1 0 - 8 6 
7 - 1 6 - 8 6 
7 - 2 1 - 8 6 
7 - 2 2 - 8 6 
7 - 2 3 - 8 6 
8 - 1 3 - 8 6 
1 1 .00 1 
1 .50 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 
.50 
1 .00 
2 . 0 0 .50 
1 .00 
3 . 2 5 .30 4 . 0 0 
5 . 5 0 5 . 5 0 5 .25 
7 . 0 0 5 . 7 5 
.50 
2 . 0 0 .50 .10 
1 .25 
1 .40 
1 .50 .75 
1 .50 
2 . 5 0 
1 .00 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 
.50 
1 .50 .50 
1 .75 
1 .25 2 . 5 0 
6 .00 
.75 5 . 0 0 
4 . 5 0 
.50 3 . 2 0 
.50 
1 .50 
1 .25 .50 
1 .50 
.25 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 
2 . 0 0 1 .40 
3 . 5 0 
3 
Defense of Counterlaim Other 
DATE $125 .00 $80 .00 $45 .00 $40 .00 $125 .00 $ 8 0 . 0 0 $ 4 5 . 0 0 $40 .00 
8 - 1 4 - 8 6 
8 - 1 8 - 8 6 
8 - 1 9 - 8 6 
8 - 2 8 - 8 6 
8 - 2 9 - 8 6 
3 . 5 0 
6 . 2 5 
1 . 0 0 
1 . 5 0 
• 50 
TOTALS 1 5 1 . 5 0 2 7 7 . 7 0 2 8 . 8 5 1 9 . 7 5 || 4 9 . 5 0 4 0 . 5 0 4 0 . 3 0 4 . 2 5 
4 
